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ABSTRACT
This paper outlines a "hermeneutic theory of democracy"
and
uses
it
to
analyze
the
debate
between
liberal
individualists and communitarians regarding citizenship. The
hermeneutic approach offers fresh insight into each of these
perspectives and facilitates substantive communication between
them by drawing out implications of the emphasis they both
place on democratic processes. Hermeneutic theory conceives of
democracy as a two-sided process. The first half of the
hermeneutic circle sees the shared understandings and culture
of the community as constitutive of the individual. The second
half sees individuals, in all their diversity, as constitutive
of the matrix of shared understandings and culture. It is
argued that the communitarian view of citizenship and
democracy, by insisting that the community is (or ought to be)
antecedent to the individual, emphasizes the first half of the
hermeneutic
circle,
while
the
liberal
individualist
perspective, which stresses that the individual is (or ought
to be) antecedent to the community, emphasize the second half.
This paper,
then, calls attention to the foundational
imbalances in liberal individualism and communitarianism which
in turn produce truncated models of the citizen,
the
community, and democratic processes. In liberal individualism
and communitarianism we find reified segments of democratic
processes rather than functioning components and an animated
whole. By contrast, the identity of the hermeneutic self is
not fully autonomous or entirely socially-constituted, but
rather an integrated combination of individuated and communal
factors. Accordingly, in the hermeneutic model, neither the
individual nor the community is considered epistemologically
antecedent to the other. In hermeneutic democracy, the
interdependent functioning of both halves of the hermeneutic
circle constitutes the cycle of democratic processes. The
paper concludes that the hermeneutic model serves two
purposes. First, it provides a discrete, moderate theory of
citizenship and democracy capable of communicating on common
ground with both liberal individualists and communitarians.
Second,
by
avoiding
the
unwarranted
constraints
of
antecedence, it offers a balanced alternative theory of
citizenship in the often implacable debate between liberal
individualists and communitarians.

COMMUNITARIANISM, LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE MYTH OF
ANTECEDENCE: A DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE CITIZENSHIP
DEBATE BETWEEN LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISTS AND COMMUNITARIANS

Introduction

The issue of citizenship, with the various theoretical
and practical questions it raises, is a primary forum for
the debate between liberal individualists and
communitarians. The project undertaken in this essay is to
assess the controversy between liberal individualists and
communitarians on the topic of citizenship through the lens
of what I will call hermeneutic democracy. My thesis is that
this approach offers fresh insight into both perspectives
and facilitates substantive communication between them by
drawing out implications of the emphasis they each place on
significant facets of democratic processes.
For liberal individualists, the individual is
antecedent to and constitutive of the community. Conversely,
for communitarians, community is antecedent to and
constitutive of the individual. We shall see that
contrasting views on the nature and constitution of the self
are at the root of these differences. Since each perspective
uses a model of the self to construct the prototype of a
citizen, the trajectories set by differences at this level
result in vastly disparate standpoints. Liberal
individualists postulate autonomous individuals entering
2
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society from the state of nature. Communitarian tenets are
grounded in the framework of socially-constituted humans as
members of communities. Upon analysis, however, it will
become evident that communitarians and liberal
individualists rely on an assumption of democracy in
depictions of the citizen and the relationship between the
citizen and the polity. Moreover, in both cases, the
benefits afforded by the inclusion of democracy are
indispensable although generally unacknowledged.
In order to establish a vantage point from which we may
examine the communitarian and liberal individualist views of
citizenship and the aspects of democracy which they embrace,
it is essential to delineate hermeneutic democracy as a
discrete model. Hermeneutic theory conceives of democracy as
a two-sided process, where the first half sees shared
understandings and culture as constituting the individual,
and the second half sees individuals, in all their
diversity, as constituting the matrix of shared culture and
understandings.
In the first half of the hermeneutical circle, citizens
share membership in a polity, partake of a common socio
political culture, and are collectively impacted at various
times by a slate of salient communal issues. These areas of
commonality are the infrastructure for communicative
interaction. Public discourse and policy formulation within
the context of community are the initial half of the

4
processes which comprise the circle of hermeneutic
democracy. This portion of the hermeneutic circle reflects
the impact of community on the identity of the self, and the
activity of the socially-constituted aspects of the self.
The second half of the circle is the activity of
citizens as individual deliberators engaged in the appraisal
of communal norms and consensus. The dialectics of community
life augment individual and collective self-understandings,
including enhancing the capacity for individual and
collective self-evaluation. The ongoing reexamination of the
community by its citizens is a reflection of the impact of
individuals on the community, and the activity of the
individuated, autonomous facets of the self. This half of
the hermeneutic circle sustains the vitality of political
processes and upholds the status of citizenship by averting
the influence of unexamined assumptions and outmoded
precedents. While we anticipate that some voices will be
more influential than others, incorporation of the dynamics
of critical self-appraisal ensures that deprivileged
viewpoints and marginalized interests will continue to find
their expression.
In the model of hermeneutic democracy, the two
interrelated facets of democratic functioning are the two
halves which make up the whole. Whereas the hermeneutic
model is characterized by an ongoing cycle of immanent
processes, communitarians and liberal individualists each
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portray a fragmented half, rendered inert as a result of
having been disengaged from the other. The communitarian
view of citizenship emphasizes the first half of the
hermeneutic circle: shared understandings are the result of
common community membership, and are the basis upon which
citizens come together for public dialogue. Correspondingly,
the liberal individualist view of citizenship stresses the
second half of the hermeneutic circle: individual reflection
provides citizens with the perspective whereby they may
critique the premises of the political community and the
appropriateness of its decisions.
The communitarian and liberal individualist models of
citizenship include aspects of democracy. Yet, the
communitarian insistence on the antecedence of the
community, and the liberal individualist insistence on the
antecedence of the individual, result in truncated models of
the citizen, the community, and democratic processes. In
liberal individualism and communitarianism, we find reified
segments rather than functioning components of an animated
whole. The model of citizenship grounded in hermeneutic
democracy offers the means of analyzing the liberal
individualist-communitarian debate in terms of the
democratic processes which each perspective affirms.
However, the distinguishing feature of the hermeneutic model
of citizenship is the absence of the constraints of
antecedence: the identity of the hermeneutic self is neither
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fully individuated, nor entirely socially-constituted, but
rather an integrated combination of communal and autonomous
factors. Similarly, in the hermeneutic model, neither the
individual nor the community is epistemologically
antecedent.
As the theoretical point of reference for this essay, I
suggest that Aristotle can be read as propounding the
hermeneutic conception of democratic processes which I
advance.1 At the most fundamental level, Aristotle's polity
exhibits a moderated balance between concern for the
individual and concern for the community. This aspect of
hermeneutic democracy combined with the fact that essential
characteristics of democracy appear in the communitarian and
liberal individualist models, mean that an Aristotelian
perspective provides not simply an alternative, but a middle
ground. The identity of the self of the hermeneutic model is
comprised of a combination of socially-contingent and
autonomous qualities. Consequently, the hermeneutic model of
the self as a citizen engaged in democratic processes avoids
1 Throughout this essay I comply with modern usage in using
the term "democracy," as the equivalent of what Aristotle referred
to as politeia. As we know, in Aristotle's six-cell matrix,
democracy is actually the deviated form of politeia. In his words,
"political control exercised by the mass of the populace in the
common interest is politeia." Aristotle, The Politics. Penguin,
1962; 1279a32. Politeia is the arrangement in which authority rests
in the hands of the many and they wield it in the interest of the
citizen body. Democracy is the deviation of polity in that it is
characterized by the rule of "men without means," who do not "aim
to be of profit to the common interest." Ibid., 1279b4. Please see
in addition, Ibid., IV, ii, "Constitutions Placed in Order of
Merit"; also, IV, iii, "Why There Are Several Constitutions."

7
the constraints created by the dualism which is so pervasive
in the debate between liberal individualists and
communitarians.
Because their fundamental visions of the self are so
different, the majority of what we have witnessed up to this
point in the debate between liberal individualists and
communitarians is two sides talking at each other. For the
most part, meaningful exchange is deterred by a seeming lack
of common ground. A conception of citizenship, drawing on
the resources of hermeneutic democracy, provides a context
for communication between communitarians and liberal
individualists because it integrates the sociallyconstituted and individualistic aspects of the self in a
manner which indicates that these two facets of an
individual need not be mutually exclusive.
The moderating effects of hermeneutic processes as
outlined in Aristotelian thought, affords an equilibrium
between consideration of theory and practice and the
individual and the community, making it possible to discuss
theory and practice and the individual and the community
without conflating them, or giving one half of either pair
priority over the other. The contrast between this stance,
on the one hand, and liberal individualism and
communitarianism, on the other, is clear. The premises of
liberal individualism constantly pull in the direction of
the importance and options of the individual. In the same
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manner, the assumptions of communitarianism push this
perspective toward an emphasis on the privileges and
prerogatives of the community.

f

The essential ingredient of hermeneutic democracy is
public dialogue as the context for the exchange of ideas and
decision-making. The first norm of democratic discourse is
that neither perspectives nor potential solutions are
rejected out of hand. This grounding is congruous with the
principles of democracy, and with the corresponding
hermeneutic epistemology. The consequence is a pragmatic
conception of theory, and epistemological pluralism, meaning
that the fairness of democratic discourse and the legitimacy
of the decisions it yields are derived directly from its
inclusiveness.
The relationships between liberal individualism and
communitarianism, and the components of democratic
functioning which they espouse, are not without problems.
For liberal individualists and communitarians, the central
problems of citizenship are twofold, appearing at the level
of the individual and of the polity. The liberal
individualist anticipates voluntary citizen involvement in
the forms of voting, citizen consent to the rule of law, and
cooperation with institutionalized procedures in the event
of conflicts of interest. The initial tension between
liberal individualism and democracy is that the self who
began life in the state of nature is inclined toward neither
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involvement nor compromise. Regarding the polity, the
liberal individualist claim that its model of the self is
universally applicable makes it extremely difficult for
liberal individualists to defend restrictions on the
accessibility of citizenship, since all individuals ought to
enjoy comparable rights. Consequently, the question of who
is entitled to the privileges of democratic citizenship, and
on what bases, can only be resolved if the nation-state is
accepted as a given, and is justified on pragmatic, rather
than philosophical grounds. In short, the priority of the
individual conjoined with the universality of liberal tenets
and democratic mechanisms embedded in liberal political
institutions, sets up the dissonance between the liberal
individualist vision for unrestricted individual selfdetermination and the practical reality of the boundaries of
the modern nation-state.
For communitarians, the initial problem of citizenship
is that communitarianism portrays the self as a citizen
unequipped to engage in individual deliberation, or to
prioritize the demands of the multiple memberships
characteristic of modern society. The tension between
communitarian and democratic premises on the issue of
citizenship is the proclivity for communitarians to
emphasize the distinction between citizens and non-citizens
as the justification for community boundaries. But from a
democratic standpoint, distinctions made on the basis of
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heredity are politically irrelevant because such attributes
have negligible bearing on citizenship skills.
In communitarianism the individual citizen relates to
the state through a particular sub-group— the community of
origin as defined by some ascribed characteristic. The
claims of this primary membership have the potential of
placing the citizen at odds with the modern nation-state. By
contrast, liberal individualists depict an individual
citizen relating directly to the state without the buffering
effects of intermediary organizations. The liberal
individualist citizen is concerned with protecting his/her
private life from state intrusion, because the private realm
is the sphere of human fulfillment. In this schema, multiple
political and social memberships have little effect on the
relationship between this citizen and the state, or on the
state itself.
Differing aspects of democracy are incorporated by
communitarians and liberal individualists. Communitarian
depictions of community discourse and communicative
interaction suggest an openness of expression seemingly akin
to democratic dialogue. However, the significant point for
communitarians is that just as community is prior to the
individual, shared understandings are antecedent to communal
communication. Therefore, democracy in the context of
communitarianism is reduced to discourse as a means of
uncovering the pre-existent areas of general consensus and a
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celebration of commonality. From a communitarian
perspective, discourse in the community is not so much
public as social, and as with shared understandings, the
social precedes the political. Because affirmations of
commonality are intrinsically fulfilling, allusions to
democratic functioning become intertwined with the
community's capacity to provide the good life.
To liberal individualists, democracy is a means of
protecting individual citizens because the framework of
democracy provides the matrix for the design of institutions
which give citizens adequate control over the apparatus of
the state. In addition, liberal individualists advocate
democracy because it is thought to encourage civic spirit
among individuals whose interests are fundamentally
presocial and prepolitical. The paradox of the relationship
between the citizen and the state for liberal democracy is
that the state is the guarantor of personal liberty, but
also has the propensity and means to intrude into the
private lives and choices of citizens.
Because democracy is essential to the communitarian
vision of the good life in the community, and to the wellordered society of liberal individualists, we must ask how
these two models would look if the elements of democracy
they incorporate were removed. Without democracy, the polity
created by communitarianism is vulnerable to collectivism,
exclusivity, and internally-established requisites of
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homogeneity as the basis for shared understandings. Without
democracy, the polity created by liberal individualism is
vulnerable to fragmentation, civic apathy, and antagonistic
relations between citizens and between citizens and state,
since the state is the most likely assailant of individual
rights.
Without democracy, the non-elective aspects of a
communitarian community become pivotal. Community membership
is not determined volitionally but by birth, on the basis of
hereditary characteristics. Moreover, communitarians have
little to say about community leadership. We are left to
wonder who becomes a leader and why. If ascribed attributes
are the foundation of community, and democratic processes
are not specified, the community may easily be brought under
the influence of non-elected leaders because of their
populistic charisma. More important, without an explicit
inclusion of democracy there are no grounds for constraint
on the non-democratic impulses of leaders.
The leap of faith made by communitarians is the premise
that common inherited qualities will result in shared
understandings. As a consequence, the discourse of
communitarianism is not intended to facilitate collective
deliberation or augmentation of understanding. The
undemocratic propensities of communitarianism are rooted in
the fallacies of this basic assumption. Although
communitarians portray communities engaging in public
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discourse, we find that the purpose of such activity is
perpetuation of the community rather than the uncovering of
citizens' opinions or joint reasoning.
Without democracy, liberal individualism devolves into
atomistic anarchy. The liberal individualist emphasis on
personal liberty combined with conceptualizing the private
realm as the venue for fulfillment prompts recollection of
the liberal adage th^t freedom starts where politics end.
Without democratic institutions the liberal individualist
self inclines back toward the state of nature. Without
democratic procedures, amicable conflict resolution is
likely to elude free individuals, each pursuing a personal
conception of the good life.
In order to depict a well-ordered society, liberal
individualists require not only political institutions, but
that those institutions be democratic. Otherwise, citizens
are not vested with the authority necessary to keep the
apparatus of the state in check. In a liberal democracy the
rule of law provides for diffusion of power and the
accountability of leaders to the citizenry, and is therefore
the appropriate mechanism of governmental restraint.
Democracy must be the distinguishing feature of the polity
of liberal individualism because without it individuals are
hopelessly mired in contentious relations with each other
and with the state.
The leap of faith among liberal individualists is from
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the abstract construction of primordial man to the
exigencies of dealing with actual citizens. The nameless,
faceless individual in the state of nature, or behind the
veil, is a utopian construct masquerading as a practical
first order premise. For liberal individualism, democracy is
the means of promoting not only civil society but civility.
It is the explicit inclusion of democracy which makes
movement from the theoretical to the practical possible
because liberal individualists must have institutions
capable of mediating between free and equal citizens, and
must promote the activities associated with democracy in
order to encourage associational relationships between
citizens in their common interest.
By rejecting the inevitability of political conflict
and choosing aspects of democracy for instrumental reasons,
communitarians and liberal individualists miss its essence.
Each perspective borrows facets of democracy in order to
explicate the well-functioning polity. But because democracy
is a means of fulfilling other objectives, the
transformative potential of democracy for both individual
citizens and the polity at large eludes them. Communitarians
appear unaware of the possibility that democratic discourse
is an avenue for the development of shared understandings
which can in turn serve as the referents for practical
policy decisions. Liberal individualists seem inattentive to
the prospect that relations among citizens, and between
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citizens and the state, could rise above the level of
suspicious tolerance. Neither perspective articulates the
likelihood that democratic discourse could constructively
expand citizens* self-understanding and thereby increase the
menu of options for personal and collective choices.
The hermeneutic model of democracy provides
communitarians with a means of validating the differences,
as evidenced in the diversity of ideas, within the citizen
body. Hermeneutic democracy acknowledges the legitimacy of
disparate, even conflicting viewpoints; it does not assume
nor depend on intellectual and cultural homogeneity as the
point of departure for discourse. The hermeneutic model of
democracy provides liberal individualists an explanation for
consensus which goes beyond the vagaries of a coincidental
convergence of interests. Hermeneutic democracy builds the
foundation of consensus upon public discourse, and
incorporates norms which nurture mutual respect and
persuasibility. The hermeneutic model regards democracy as
both a means and an end. We shall see that as a means,
hermeneutic democracy formulates distinctive expectations of
what can be accomplished through public discourse. As an
end, hermeneutic democracy offers individual citizens a
venue of fulfillment through active involvement in
collective decisions.
Hermeneutic democracy builds a common area for
communication between liberal individualists and
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communitarians on the issue of citizenship because it takes
an integrative and accommodative approach to
conceptualization of the self and of the polity. A central
aim of communitarians is the strengthening and perpetuation
of the bonds of community. An important objective of liberal
individualists is safeguarding the personal liberty and
autonomy of individual citizens. The tenets and processes
which comprise the hermeneutic circle of democratic
functioning offer to communitarians and liberal
individualists the means of moderating intractable premises
regarding the self which constrain their perspectives, while
enhancing the democratic facets of citizen activity evident
in each of the models. In so doing, hermeneutic democracy
provides a theory of citizenship which stands out as a
balanced and conciliatory third alternative in the debate
between liberal individualists and communitarians.
The first portion of this essay focuses on
communitarian conceptions of the self, the citizen, and the
political community. The second section is devoted to
liberal individualist perspectives on these points. The
third part of this essay grounds the model of hermeneutic
democracy in the Aristotelian perspective on the self, the
activities associated with citizenship, and the dynamic
processes which comprise the hermeneutic circle. Within this
context, the conclusion attempts to contribute to our
understanding of the viewpoints of liberal individualists
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and communitarians regarding the constitution of the self,
and the ramifications of prioritizing either the individual
or the community. Finally, the conclusion draws out
implications of how a hermeneutic approach revitalizes our
perceptions of democratic citizenship by conceptualizing
democracy as an animated circle of hermeneutic processes.

Chapter I:
The Self and Citizen of Communitarianism

The History of Conceptions of the Communitarian Self
The communitarian authors cited in this essay are
unanimous in depicting the impact of community on individual
citizens to be positive. But explaining the reasons for this
requires more than the premises that living in communities
is a natural state of affairs and that humans are products
of their environments. These tenets alone can account only
for a passive and benign view of community, one which would
not be capable of differentiating itself from liberal
individualism, since even liberal individualists are
products of liberal communities. Liberal individualism
reflects a spectrum of viewpoints, and similarly,
communitarianism is a melange of opinions. We will address
the fundamental issue of citizenship by analyzing three
historical exemplars, and by asking what it means to be a
member of a community, and why this membership is both
constitutive and beneficial.
What is assumed but not articulated by the historical
and contemporary communitarian authors cited here is
democratic interaction between individuals and the
community. Moreover, interaction informed by democratic
18
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principles is the condition which ensures that this
interchange will be positive and constructive. The facet of
hermeneutic democracy which makes the relationship amicable,
as well as advantageous to members, is the capacity for
members to utilize shared understandings as a foundation
from which to establish consensus on day-to-day questions.
In other words, communitarian depictions of communal
functioning exemplify the first phase of the hermeneutic
circle.
Communitarians presuppose the existence of shared
understandings and common interests ? to be a member of a
community is to subscribe to particular values and
viewpoints. On this basis, the function of discourse within
the community is to build on the pre-existent foundation of
commonality in order to uncover communal inclinations on
issues at hand. This leads us to several implications of the
emphasis on community and the socially-constituted self
found in the communitarian vision of democracy and
citizenship.
The first is a truncated account of democratic
discourse and processes since the assumption of shared
understandings indicates that arriving at consensus is a
fairly straightforward task. By contrast to the hermeneutic
model, public discourse in the communitarian schema uncovers
the consensus which already exists because of shared
understandings. In the hermeneutic model of democracy,
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public discourse precedes and is a means of establishing
consensus. Second, because arriving at agreement is expected
to be unproblematic, there is little need for persuasion.
Third, the communitarian model of citizenship is void of
mechanisms that would encourage the incorporation of
differing and dissenting viewpoints, and of incentives to
question the validity of fundamental communal perspectives
or their practical applications. In short, the second
portion of the hermeneutical circle is missing. For these
reasons, the communitarian renderings of democracy and
citizenship fail to articulate the means whereby the
community can gain deliberative perspective by which to
appraise itself. The bonds of tradition become bondage to
precedent since only half of the hermeneutic cycle of the
democratic process can function without the means for
critical self-evaluation.
A factor which contributes significantly to ambiguities
and misunderstandings in the debate between liberal
individualists and communitarians is that the term
"community," as used by communitarians, has two broad
categories of meanings. The connotations of these two
groupings can be differentiated by asking whether the term
is used to endorse recognition of the ubiquitous influence
of communities in contributing to the identity and
perceptions of individuals, or whether community positively
impacts its members and is therefore associated with the
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good life. In the latter case, communitarians rely on the
inclusion of democracy to explain the advantages of
community. The second definition of community involves a
specific type of political functioning, that is, democracy,
and carries normative implications since it makes democracy
the standard for political processes.
The tradition of communitarianism reflects a range of
perspectives regarding the constitution of the self and the
importance of community. In examining the facets of
contemporary communitarianism pertinent to the issue of
citizenship, the impact of several strands of historical
thought is evident. For our purposes, three will be
considered. First is the unified community created by the
General Will of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Second is community
based on tradition as an accumulation of evolutionary
development, portrayed by Edmund Burke. Third, is community
as the essential element of the human experience because it
provides the framework for interaction. Without interaction
even self-awareness is impossible. This strand of
communitarian thought is found in the work of Georg Hegel.
Each of these perspectives have remained significant and are
evident in contemporary communitarianism. Each reflects a
particular emphasis on the nature and role of the political
community, and consequently, what it means to be a citizen.
These three are chosen from the canon of secular
communitarianism because they articulate facets of
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communitarian thought which remain influential. Jean Jacques
Rousseau's conception of the General Will furnishes an ideal
of the potential for solidarity and unity of interest in a
political community. The impact of Rousseau is evident in
the thought of Charles Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre, among
others. Edmund Burke depicts socially-constructed
individuals as citizens of communities where tradition and
precedent are the optimal guides for wise opinions and
actions. The perspectives of Alisdair MacIntyre and Michael
Sandel similarly reflect a fundamental conservatism rooted
in the value of the traditions and histories of particular
communities. The model of the self which serves as the
foundation of Hegel's philosophy remains important to
communitarianism because it provides an alternative to the
self of liberal individualism. For Hegel and Burke, it is a
fallacy to conceptualize a human in isolation from others.
The influence of Hegel is explicitly evident in the thought
of Charles Taylor, and adherence to analogous models of the
self are apparent in the work of Michael Walzer and Michael
Sandel.
Rousseau's
a

explication of the General Will requires, as

framework, a cohesive community.

The "social pact,"

comparable to Locke's contract, transposes the individual
from the state of nature into civil society. By contrast
however, Rousseau's citizen does not enter the political
community as a person with property holdings and assorted
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private interests. Rather, "every individual gives himself
absolutely" in order to form a unified whole:
Each one of us puts into the community his person
and all his powers under the supreme direction of
the general will; and as a body, we incorporate
every member as an indivisible part of the
whole.2
The citizen depicted by Rousseau gains much by moving
from life as an individual in the state of nature to life as
a member of the political community. Indeed, he/she is
transformed from an "stupid, limited animal" into an
"intelligent" citizen.3 In citing the ramifications of this
metamorphosis Rousseau exalts both the community and the
political. The parameters of the political and public realms
are circumscribed so broadly that the private realm is all
but obliterated. From the standpoints of citizenship and
community, the General Will as an abstract conception enjoys
wide appeal; one reason is that it offers an ideal of a

2 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (London:
Penguin, 1968), 61. Via the General Will, the interests of the
political community are singularized into one collective interest.
The General Will interprets this interest and administers all
decisions related to its execution. The decisions made by the
General Will "will always be good." Ibid., 73. Consequently,
adherence to the General Will as the referent yields infallible
direction, and resisting it is synonymous with removing oneself
from the community.The reductio ad absurdum of the General Will is
authoritarian totalitarianism since evidences of individuality,
much less dissent, are taken as threats to the political community,
"Nothing is more dangerous in public affairs than the influence of
private interests." Ibid., 112.
3 Ibid., 65. Please see also Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse
on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality," in The First and
Second Discourses. (New York: St. Martinfs Press, 1964), 115-16 and
139-141.
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unified community in which the diverse inclinations of
citizens are merged into one interest.
In Edmund Burke we have an excellent exemplar of a
perspective founded on the socially-constituted self and
conservative communitarianism. For Burke, the community of
origin is the primary determinant of an individual1s
fundamental perspectives. Burkean communitarianism is not so
much a study in the politics of identity as an exposition of
the origins of reasonable opinions. This is indicated
throughout the Reflections on the Revolution in France:
"...[B]eing a citizen of a particular state is being bound
up in a considerable degree by its public will...."4 Along
with this, Burke illustrates the epistemological
particularism which has become a pillar of communitarian
thought: Any form of political arrangement may only be
evaluated in the context of its unique circumstances,
Circumstances give in reality to every political
principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating
effect. The circumstances are what render every civil
and political scheme beneficial or noxious to
mankind.5
For Burke, the value of the political community is its
capacity to provide the context for its citizens to
collectively rise above mere life, and to partake of the
good life,

4 Edmund Burke, Reflections
(London: Penguin, 1986), 88.
5 Ibid., 90.
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11[The state] is to be looked on with other
reverence; because it is not a partnership in
things subservient only to the gross animal
existence of a temporary and perishable nature."6

The body of citizens is the foundation of consensus, in that
it is the base of support for the political system.7 The
citizens of this political community participate primarily
by showing proper reverence for their state. Moreover, the
state is an accretion of tradition whose merit rests on its
capacity to reflect evolutionary progress in the accumulated
wisdom of forbearers.
Accordingly, citizens are socially-constituted persons
in the sense that knowledge of self is formed relative to
other members of the community, both in the present and the
past. From this premise follows Burke's belief that a wellorganized community is capable of producing good citizens.8
6 Ibid., 194. Because of their membership, citizens of every
era are like the links of a chain which extends into the past and
into the future, [The state] "becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are living,
those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Ibid., 194.
Citizenship furnishes the individual with both a temporal identity
and the possibility of immortality by providing a connection with
the past and the future.
7 However, the making of political decisions is to be
undertaken by those with technical expertise and suitable
character, "A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve,
taken together, would be my standard of a statesman." Ibid., 2 67.
8 As we are well aware, in Reflections on the French
Revolution, this cuts both ways. Burke's affirmation of British
political and civil society is contrasted with alarm over
repercussions of the revolution in France. Burke takes care to
demonstrate that his preference of the British political system is
based on sound judgement rather than unreasoned allegiance.
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The organization and structure of community are variables in
the communally-determined identity of the Burkean self since
individuals have identities as commoners, aristocrats, and
so on. In Britain, which is Burke's ideal community, the
estates as sub-communities are entirely harmonious with, and
indeed reinforce, the super-community of the state.
In juxtaposing the British political system with the
French Revolutionary government, Burke develops a meticulous
defense of tradition as a guide, when it is tempered with
provisions for incremental change.9 The new community
created by the French revolutionaries is an effort to sweep
away everything associated with the ancien regime. To Burke,
this is preposterous because in so doing the French have cut
themselves off from the only possible source of practical
and applicable knowledge.10 As the outcome, Burke
anticipates a community of rootless and fatuous citizens
lacking direction, with the potential to become an

9 "A state without the means of some change is without the
means of its conservation." Burke cites Britain's combination of
statutory and common law as the means of gradual and evolutionary
transformation. By contrast, the leaders of the French Revolution
have attempted to sweep away all that was associated with civil and
political society under the Bourbons. Burke warns, "But power, of
some kind or other, will survive the shock in which manners and
opinions perish; and it will find other and worse means for its
support." Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France.
(London: Penguin, 1986), 106 and 172.
10 "In history a great volume is unrolled for our instruction,
drawing the materials of future wisdom from the past errors...."
Ibid., 247.
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international menace.11
Hegel uses the language of metaphysics to render the
socially-constructed self. For Hegel, understanding of
humans is sought on a collective basis, by identifying the
Spirit,

(alternatively translated as Mind or Reason), of a

given community during a particular era. The inception and
character of a community's Spirit is traced back to the
elemental interaction between individuals.12 Interaction as
a requisite of self-consciousness and community is the
foundation of the socially-constituted self.
The chief characteristic of the citizen is his/her
interconnectedness to all other members of the community.
Thus, the political community is depicted as a network,
There is formed a system of complete
interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness
and legal status of one man is interwoven with
the livelihood, happiness and rights of all. On
this system, individual happiness, etc., depend,
and only in this connected system are they
actualized and secured.13
The claim made here is fundamental to communitarianism: The
11 "I cannot conceive how any man can have brought himself to
that pitch of presumption to consider his country as nothing but
carte blanche, upon which he may scribble whatever he pleases."
Ibid., 266.
12 "For ethical life is nothing other than the absolute
spiritual unity of the essence of individuals...." Georg F. W.
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, 174. "At first this active reason
is conscious of itself only as an individual, and as such must
demand and bring forth its actuality in another." Ibid., 175.
"Consciousness of an other...is indeed itself necessarily selfconsciousness...." Ibid., 211.
13 Georg Hegel, "Philosophy of Right," in Political Writings.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 64), 12 0.
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community is a prerequisite of human fulfillment. As we
shall see, this is frequently the basis upon which community
is elevated to the stature it enjoys in communitarianism.
The political community is far more than a pragmatic
response to the difficulties encountered by individuals in
the state of nature. The community may be an efficient means
by which to provide for the necessities of life, but of far
greater significance, the community is the means of living
the good life.
The self whose identity is socially-constituted
combined with the notion of community as the venue for human
fulfillment means that the ideal citizen is one who lives in
harmony with community norms. Hegel maintains that this
insight has classical roots, "The wisest among the ancients
declared that wisdom and virtue consist in living in
accordance with the customs of one's own people."14 This
bears obvious resemblance to Burke. The actualization of
self occurs in the context of the community and in a
cultivated consonance between the individual and the
standards of the group. The possibility of individual self
development, in a context separate from the community, is
implicitly dismissed by Burke and Hegel and explicitly
discouraged by Rousseau.

14 Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1910), 223.
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The Communitarian Self as the Prototype for the Citizen
The common foundation of contemporary secular
communitarianism is the socially-constructed self grounded
in a particularistic and constructivist epistemology. The
communitarian claim that human identity is sociallyconstituted raises the question of how communities
contribute to individual development and identity. Although
this leaves room for variance, communities are generally
distinguished by some shared understanding. The organizing
principle of a community is a basic commonality such as
culture, religion, or a physical attribute like ethnicity.
Moreover, communities whose shared understandings are
founded in cultural, religious or ethnic commonality develop
agendas which include political goals. For this reason, the
part played by the propensity for humans to group themselves
according to culture, religion and ethnicity is viewed here
in the context of collective political relations, or, in
terms of the public and political interests of
communities.15
15 To avoid misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that
communitarians vary the vocabulary used when referring to what is
commonly held to be community. Charles Taylor frequently uses the
term "culture.11 Michael Sandel refers to community commonalities in
terms of "shared history," although he also articulates a number of
practical forms which communities make take. Please see Michael J.
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 31. Alisdair
MacIntyre most commonly refers to communities as "traditions."
Please see After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.
Robert Bellah and the authors of Habits of the Heart refer to the
benefits of communitarian thinking in sociological terms, such as
"shared conceptions of the common good," "social ecology," and
"common dialogue," as well as using traditional terms to identify
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Fundamental to communitarian thought is the premise
that there are multiple societal and communal factors which
contribute to the identity, personality and selfunderstanding of each human being.16 Acknowledging the
influence of the communities of which we are a part, is not
merely a theoretical technique used to establish first order
principles. Rather, communitarians associate this
acknowledgement with cognizance of what determines the
evolution of the framework and reference points of selfunderstanding. Moreover, it is on this basis that
communitarianism claims a valid representation of the nature
of humans and associative relationships, and therefore, its
philosophical authority and applicability.
Community as the context of accumulated wisdom which
operates through the network of social and political
relationships is a feature evident in the thought of Edmund
Burke and Michael Sandel. For Burke and Sandel, the
individual is socially-constituted in the sense that
community is the framework for all strata of human

recognizable communities such as family, religious, civic and
political communities. Michael Walzer forthrightly refers to
communities, almost invariably using that term itself rather than
synonyms. Please see Michael Walzer, "Complex Equality," and
"Membership," in Spheres of Justice.
16 Please see Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self Chapters
1 and 4; also, " ...[T]he free individual of the West is only what
he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought
him to be and which nourishes him....I doubt whether we could
maintain our sense of ourselves as autonomous beings...." Charles
Taylor, "Atomism," Philosophy and the Human Sciences. 206.
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understanding— from self-awareness to a world view. The
perspective of Sandel also resonates with Hegel regarding
the integral role of human interaction. The views of Hegel
and Sandel on this point suggest that construction of an
isolated individual, or an unencumbered self, is merely a
chimera.
As articulated by Michael Sandel, a communitarian selfunderstanding involves awareness that there are
circumstantial and environmental factors which profoundly
impact the formation and composition of the self:
For to have character is to know that I move in a
history I neither summon nor command, which
carries consequences none the less for my choices
and conduct. It draws me closer to some and more
distant from others;
it makes some
aims more
appropriate, others less so. As a self
interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my
history and in this sense to distance myself from
it, but the distance is always precarious and
provisional, the point of reflection never finally
secured outside the history itself. A person with
character thus knows that he is implicated in
various ways even as
he reflects, and feels the
moral weight of what
he knows.17
This conveys the dynamics of the internal workings of the
individual, and indicates the centrality of community by
suggesting that the beliefs derived from commonality with
other members of the community are the referent for the
internal politics of the self. It is worth noting that
communal identities are not an overlay added to a "real,"
essential, or primitive self. A socially-constituted self is
17 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 179.
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the real and essential self.
For Alisdair MacIntyre, attempting to ignore the debt
to

tradition, is to cut oneself off from the source of

rational evaluation and moral reasoning,
The person outside all traditions lacks sufficient
rational resources for enquiry and...has no
adequate relevant means of rational evaluation and
hence can come to no well grounded conclusion,
including the conclusion that no tradition can
vindicate itself against any other. To be outside
all traditions is to be a stranger to enquiry; it
is to be in a state of intellectual and moral
destitution....18
The self without the community as a framework for ethical
understanding is an alienated and arational being. In a
manner similar to that outlined by Sandel, communal shared
understandings are the beacons which guide personal
reflection. Once again it becomes clear that the sociallyconstituted self is not merely intended as an abstract
construct, but as an immanently applicable model.
Accordingly, we find in communitarian thought articulation
of the inverse: the morally self sufficient and autonomous
individual is a delusion. For MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel and
Bellah, the self which serves as the cornerstone of liberal
individualism is pointless as a philosophical starting point

18 Alisdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 367. It should
be noted that for MacIntyre, "enquiry11 describes moral reasoning.
Please see "Rival Justices, Competing Rationalities," in
Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?.
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because it is a fallacy.19
With Jean Jacques Rousseau, Alisdair MacIntyre shares
an emphasis on the unity of interests within a community,
and the morality of shared understandings. In both cases,
the legitimacy of community decisions is derived from
agreement on a fundamental slate of social goods.
MacIntyre's reliance on traditions of moral enquiry as the
grounding for community values also bears some similarity to
Edmund Burke's emphasis on history and precedent. However,
for MacIntyre the importance of history lies in the
evolution of the prioritization of virtues20, whereas for
Burke, the British model of community decision-making is
validated on the basis of the admirable national community
which Britain has become.
MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Walzer, Bellah and co
authors seek to add a dimension to human understanding in
explicating how collective, community-based factors effect
self-understanding, and foundational social and political

19 Please see Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. Chapters 5, 6,
9 and 18, and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. Chapter 17?
Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self, and "Atomism," in
Philosophy and the Human Sciences. 187 210; Michael Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Part I; Robert Bellah, et
al., Habits of the Heart.
20 MacIntyre criticizes "liberal individualism" inter alia
because it "illegitimately ignores the inescapably historically and
socially context-bound character which any substantive set of
principles of rationality, whether theoretical or practical, is
bound
to
have."
Alisdair MacIntyre,
Whose
Justice,
Which
Rationality? (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 4.
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concepts.21 Furthermore, it is implicit that the impact of
community is positive. The benefit of community for a
socially-constituted self is a foundation and context for
shared understanding which affords to members a stable
referent upon which to build one’s personal identity. The
communitarians cited have an assortment of reasons for their
emphasis on community. These reasons provide insight into
the degree to which the community is emphasized relative to

21 The grouping and categorization of persons necessarily
involves some oversimplification. In the case of Michael Walzer
this
is particularly evident because his thought combines
fundamental liberal (although not atomistic) premises, with strong
advocacy of the benefits of community. Walzer's chapter on
"Membership" in Spheres of Justice is an appropriate case in point.
Walzer exhibits a fundamental concern is for the physical security
and protection of the rights of individuals as autonomous moral
beings, "Statelessness is a condition of infinite danger." In
addition, Walzer is interested in the just distribution of a social
good, "The
primary good that we distribute to one another is
membership...." But this is combined with the particularistic and
constructivist epistemology of immanent critique, more in line with
communitarianism, "Membership as a social good is constituted by
our
understanding;
its
value
is
fixed
by
our
work
and
conversation...." Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1983), 31-32. It would perhaps be most apt to
refer to Walzer as a liberal communitarian. Michael Walzer does not
develop a typically communitarian version of the self, in the sense
of a socially-constituted self. However, in Spheres of Justice
Walzer launches an argument which is "radically particularistic,"
and in which social justice is understood exclusively within the
context of communal frameworks. Community membership is clearly the
most valued social good, and the explication of the spheres of
justice strongly suggests multiple communities as the spheres for
distribution. Please see also, Michael Walzer, "Citizenship," in
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, "Philosophy and
Democracy," Political Theory 9 (1981), "The Communitarian Critique
of Liberalism,11 Political Theory 18 (1990), and "The Civil Society
Argument," in Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso,
1992) .
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the individual.22

The Communitarian Conception of Citizenship
To communitarians, communities are the entities which
provide citizens with the context for forming and acting on
collectively determined concepts of the good. The content
and focus of citizens' concepts of the good are inherently
social. For Charles Taylor, citizenship is a derivation of
the individual's membership in their community of origin.
Because the socially-constructed self is the only reasonable
description of a human being, the self in the context of
his/her community is the model of the citizen. This
conception of citizenship is founded on a particular
understanding of the good, since "the nature of the good
requires that it be sought in common."23
22 Over the centuries, communitarians have described and
prescribed many types of communities. However, the topics at hand
are political communitarianism and citizenship. In this context,
one additional essential of communitarianism should be mentioned:
the absence of a state/society distinction. The state/society
distinction occasionally appears in theological communitarianism.
However, the communitarian authors cited in this essay define
"political"
broadly,
are
concerned with
secular
political
communities, and view the community in extensive and inclusive
terms which obviates the purpose of a distinction between the
state, (understood as the political community), and society.
23 Charles
Taylor,
"The
Politics
of Recognition,"
in
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann
and Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
59. Consequently, Taylor explains the importance of collective
self-understanding and the genesis of the self/other distinction
within the framework of citizenship, "On their [Quebeckers] view,
a society can be organized around a definition of the good life,
without this being seen as a depreciation of those who do not
personally share this definition." Ibid., 59.
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Taylor adopts what is perhaps the most foundationalist
perspective on this point by associating ontology with
explanations of associative relationships. "Ontological
questions concern what you recognize as the factors you will
invoke to account for social life."24 If explanations of
associative relationships are ontology, the basic
understanding of community becomes the venue in which
ontological issues are played out. Taylor*s conceptions of
community and the self are theoretically holistic and
organic as opposed to atomistic and metaphysical.
Correspondingly, practical recommendations on communities,
understood as subgroups of nations, reflect a holistic
approach by upholding the value of the parameters of
communities, since these lines of demarcation permit the
maintenance of each community's distinctive features.25
24 Charles Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian
Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 159.
25 The need to preserve the distinguishing features of
communities is a matter of the utmost importance, because it can
mean
the
difference
between
survival
and
extinction.
The
substructure of Taylor's communitarian citizenship is ontological
if one accepts the definition of ontology as factors that explain
the inception of society. This is characteristically communitarian
since it is grounded in the conviction that individuals are
socially-constituted. Although Taylor cites examples of historical
and contemporary communities, the central case in point is his
community of origin, the Quebeckers of Canada. The distinguishing
features of Quebeckers are cultural and linguistic. The political
goals which Taylor advises for the Quebeckers focus on these two
facets of the community's uniqueness. Charles Taylor, "The Politics
of Recognition,"
in Multiculturalism and
"The Politics of
Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann and Charles Taylor (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992), 53-55. Taylor's advocacy of this
agenda assumes that Quebeckers possess more than one membership

37
The influence of Georg Hegel in the work of Charles
Taylor is evident in the integral place of human interaction
for all understanding including self-awareness, and the
resultant ontological conception of human relations. Hegel
observes that the objects of our consciousness can only find
their "essential reality in another."26 In similar fashion,
Taylor asserts: "I doubt whether we could maintain our sense
of ourselves as autonomous beings."27
In the case of Alisdair MacIntyre, citizenship remains
largely in the realm of theory and is tied to practice via
concerns regarding the potential impact of public ethics and
morality on policy. MacIntyre's central concern is moral
decline. The dilemma is, "We have very largely, if not
entirely lost our comprehension, both theoretical and

identity. Quebeckers are citizens of Quebec, a province with a
separate cultural and linguistic heritage, as well as citizens of
Canada. For Taylor, this is not intrinsically problematic because
individuals are assumed to simultaneously hold membership in
several communities, and be capable of having the appropriate
loyalty to each. Taylor responds to allegations of ethnocentrism by
pointing to the republican premise which is the foundation of
Canada's governance, "participation in self rule is the essence of
freedom, and part of what must be secured." Please see Charles
Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian Debate," in
Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 179.
26 Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (London: George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., 1910), 174.
27 Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in Philosophy and the Human
Sciences (Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2 06.
The impact of Hegel on Taylor can be observed also in Taylor's
theory of social action. On this point, please see Charles Taylor,
"Social Theory and Practice," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1989) .
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practical, of morality."28 Rather than a coherent and
applicable morality, we possess only the "fragments of a
conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from
which their significance derived."29 Implicit in this
critique is that the shared understandings and moral
resources available through communities provide, inter alia,
a common language capable of serving as the medium of
communication. This is evidenced in MacIntyre*s depiction of
his project,
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in
the actual world which we inhabit the language of
morality is in a...state of grave disorder....30
The problem has been identified, and requirements of a
solution are clear: A framework must be found which is
capable of providing a coherent context for the language and
understanding of morality. Communities, or "traditions,1' are
the answer to this quest.31
28 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1981), 2.
29 Ibid. , 2 .
30 Ibid. , 2.
31 The archetypical community for MacIntyre is the Athenian
polis, and Aristotelian thought is the corresponding zenith of
philosophical achievement. The crucial characteristics of the polis
are an esteem for virtue, and the guiding influence of the concept
of telos. The impact of telos for community life is its capacity to
provide a context for the self in which modes of judgement and
action can be chosen. With this foundation, citizens are in a
position to evaluate and prioritize virtues. This evaluation then
becomes the reference point for all community decision-making and
policy. In this way, the polis is the community which best provides
the context for the "language of morality." On the effects of the
absence of teleological
thinking
for both
individuals
and
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The views of citizenship and community found in
MacIntyre reflect the particularism characteristic of
communitarian thought. However, MacIntyre understands and
applies this somewhat differently than Taylor. Where Taylor
is concerned with the difficulty of making external
judgments across communities and cultures, MacIntyre
emphasizes that values form only within specific
communities. This epistemology is particularistic in
observing that the content and relative priority of values
can only be internally established, and are therefore only
relevant and applicable within the community of origin.
The problem of noncommensurability is encountered by
both Taylor and MacIntyre. Taylor's concern is with pitfalls
in the making of exogenous judgments which could be applied
across communities. For MacIntyre, the quandary is how a
community can prioritize a slate of goods when there is no
manifest way to establish a standard by which to judge them
all.32 This point is crucial to the highly-obscured, but
significant place of democracy in MacIntyre's schema. What
communities: "The self is now thought of as lacking any necessary
social identity, because the kind of social identity that it once
enjoyed is no longer available; the self is now thought of as
criterionless, because the kind of telos in terms of which it once
judged and acted is not longer thought to be credible." Ibid., 32.
32 MacIntyre opens this discussion with a reference to the
following: "... [E]very action and choice seem to aim at some good;
the good, therefore, has been well defined as that at which all
things aim. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends
at which they aim; in come cases activity is the end, in others the
end is some product beyond the activity." Aristotle, Nichomachean
Ethics, I, 1094a.
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results from a communityfs need to prioritize various goods,
is community as the context for "dialectical reasoning."33
This alludes to the communitarian version of democracy and
illustrates the operation of the first portion of the circle
of hermeneutic processes: the community utilizes discourse
grounded in shared understandings as the means of weighting
social goods, especially,

(for MacIntyre), in the form of

virtues. There are two points worthy of note here. First,
the ranking of goods is the most essential function of
communities. Second, this ranking is carried out through
dialectical processes within the community. Consequently,
public discourse is a necessity. However, beyond the
endorsement of "dialectical reasoning," neither
participatory citizenship nor democratic processes are
articulated.34
The ordering of goods and virtues within specific
communities is the sine crua non of the logic behind a
particularistic epistemology. At the same time, MacIntyre
usefully illustrates a communitarian distinction between
particularism and relativism. On one hand, the value placed

33 Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 133.
34 "From within and only from within a given polis, [citizens
are] already provided with an ordering of goods, goods to be
achieved by excellence within specific and systematic forms of
activity, integrated irito an overall rank order by the political
activity of particular citizens...." Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, 1988), 133.
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on goods and virtues is particular to specific communities.
On the other hand, within their domain,

(that is, each

community), the ranking of goods and values constitutes a
hierarchy. "Dialectical reasoning," is the,
condition of asking and answering questions about
the arche of practical rationality that one is
already a participant within a form of community
which presupposes that there is a supreme, albeit
perhaps complex, human good.35
The gradation of goods and virtues is based on community
acknowledgment of a "supreme" good, so the ordering produced
is hierarchical and community-specific, but not
relativistic.
In the thought of Michael Sandel, understanding the
importance of community in the development of personality is
a philosophically logical means of understanding the human
experience, because people are ineluctably influenced by
communities. Therefore, comprehending modes of rationality
is best pursued by observing humans as moral agents, but
within the context of communities. Community is not simply a
different format from which to ground theory. Theory is a
priori to community, and to all other experience because all
action reflects some theoretical stance,
...[P]hilosophy inhabits the world from the start;
our practices and institutions are embodiments of
theory. To engage in political practice is already
to stand in relation to theory. 6
35 Ibid., 134.
36 Michael J. Sandel,
"The Procedural Republic and
Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (February 1984), 81.

the
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MacIntyre and Taylor espouse a similar view with the
proposition that theory is apparent in the "practices11 of
individuals and communities.37
The view that theory is prior to action is a
significant component of the thought of Sandel, MacIntyre
and Taylor. A primary implication of this premise is that
the tangible practices of community life give insight into
underlying theory. Shared understandings become, in a sense,
the theory which precedes practice and communities1
practices reveal theory. The antecedence of shared
understandings as the theory which informs public discourse
yields a model of community practices which illustrates the
limitation of democratic functions to the first portion of
the circle of hermeneutic democracy. In communitarianism,
associative relationships and collective deliberation within
a community comprise the context of both theory and
practice. Theory is developed in the community as a by
product of the collectivity acting on its conception of the
good. It is therefore not necessary for theory to be spelled
out in order to serve as a guide for action.

37 mpher-e ought not to be two histories, one of political and
moral action and one of political and moral theorizing, because
there were not two pasts, one populated by actions, the other only
by theories. Every action is the bearer and expression of more or
less theory laden beliefs and concepts? every piece of theorizing
and every expression of belief is a political and moral action."
Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. 58. Please see the conception of
"practice" in Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. 175-82; also
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of
Metaphysics 25, (1971):3-51.
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For Sandel, unlike MacIntyre, community, is not the
response to a quest for coherent morality. Communities do
provide the framework for collective reflection regarding
values and goals; more importantly, communities are where we
live, where we are coming from— whether we realize it, or
admit it, or not.38 Democracy within the self and within
the community are implied by Sandel as follows:
"intersubjective" and "intrasubjective" describe the
dialogue which takes place on both levels. The self,

(i.e.

the individual citizen) is the context of intrasubjective
discourse, while the community is the context of
intersubjective discourse between citizens.39 Both the
individual and the community are aware of and attentive to
diverse internal voices.
Sandel does not argue for the founding or
revitalization of communities, but for recognition of the
impact of communities and the benefits of this impact.

38 The most basic community is the family,
the most
sophisticated is the nation, and between these two strata lie many
intermediate human associations. Possible intermediate associations
include, "tribes, neighbourhoods, cities, towns, universities,
trade unions,
national liberation movements and established
nationalisms, and ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic
communities." Please see Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
31.
39 "Intrasubjective conceptions...allow for...a plurality of
selves within a single, individual human being, as when we account
for inner deliberation in terms of the pull of competing
identities...." Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice, 63. Similarly, "intersub jective conceptions. .. embrace more
than a single, individual human being...." Ibid., 62-63.

44

Regarding citizenship, this amounts to the recommendation
that citizens relinquish atomistically oriented selfunderstandings in favor of a view in which the self is a
component of a whole, where the whole is a community.
Michael Walzer approaches the topic of community by
asking,

"what is the preferred setting, the most supportive

environment,

for the good life?"40 That the response will

be a social and collective setting is implicit in the
framing of the question. In Spheres of Justice. Walzer
proposes a system of complex equality based on the seriation
of goods corresponding to spheres of human activity. The
project is to provide an outline for the just distribution
of important goods in a manner which will not be determined
by the utility maximization and rational choice associated
with market forces and economics. The argument for complex
equality is launched in the context of politics because,
"the political community is probably the closest we can come
to a world of common meanings."41 Democracy is suggested at
40 Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions
of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992): 90.
Walzer's text, Spheres of Justice has prompted use of the phrase,
"liberal
communitarianism.11 The
essay,
"The
Civil
Society
Argument," goes beyond the book in advocating a more complex and
pluralistic account of community activity, described in terms of
"civil society."
41 Michael Walzer, "Complex Equality," Spheres of Justice. (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), 28. Membership in the political
community is the most important good, and therefore the first to be
considered.
Walzer
explicates
the
importance
of
political
membership in terms of both internal and external considerations.
For those inside the political community it is the first sphere of
shared understandings and "common meanings." By contrast, being
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this point because the distribution of political membership
is to be determined by and within the community,
The community itself is a good, conceivably the
most important good that gets distributed. But it
is a good that can only be distributed by taking
people in....membership cannot be handed out by
some external agency; its value depends on an
internal decision.42
The significant points of Walzer's conception of citizenship
are that community is the legitimate venue for decision
making, and the community provides a context of basic
consensus which facilitates collective decisions. One of the
most important responsibilities of a citizen is to help
decide the bases on which the rights of citizenship should
be allocated. Walzer indicates that this is best
accomplished through democratic processes.43

outside is perilous since, 11[S]tatelessness is a condition
infinite danger." Michael Walzer, "Membership,11 in Ibid., 32.

of

42 Michael Walzer, "Complex Equality," in Ibid., 29.
43 A less obvious point regarding Walzer, but one which is
pertinent to classifying him as a communitarian, is the methodology
he advocates for the formulation of political theory. "The Civil
Society Argument" explicates the functioning of civil society
characterized by a plurality of memberships,
networks
and
associations that create a variety of interpersonal relationships.
This model of civil society defines community broadly so as to
include all varieties of social and economic relations, as well as
those which are overtly political. Small and loose communities with
citizens having multiple memberships results in a civil society
characterized by the expression of a diversity of opinions on a
variety of topics. The citizens of civil society are "connected and
responsible," in a way which encourages civic spirit. Please see
Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions of
Radical Democracy, ed. Chnatal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 107.
The epistemology here is consonant with communitarianism because
political theory is broadly defined, and understood as the network
of shared understandings on which civil society functions.
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The communitarian conception of citizenship is
predicated on the capacity of the community to serve as the
context and reference point for shared understandings.
Community is where basic values are worked out and
propagated. By living in a community, citizens learn the
characteristics and distinctives of the group they are
members of. Consequently, community is the most influential
variable in what citizenship means to citizens. The
communitarian self is a citizen who relies on shared
understandings to make decisions which are either abstract
or practical. This analysis of the communitarian self as the
prototypical citizen raises two points also found in
critiques of communitarianism by liberal individualists.
First, because the autonomy and individuality of this
citizen are underdeveloped, he/she lacks the resources which
would be needed in order to evaluate the validity and
appropriateness of both the shared understandings and their
implications. Second, the communitarian notion of
citizenship leaves undefined the distinction between the
political and the social, between the leaders and the led,
and between the public and private realms. It is on these
bases that the communitarian conception of citizenship is
most vulnerable to criticism by liberal individualists.
We find that the communitarian self is not inclined
toward the formation or expression of autonomous opinions
and critical assessments of the community. The extent of the
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influence of the communal environment in the formation of
the identity of the communitarian self precludes the
likelihood of the individual functioning in this manner.
Consequently, collected communitarian selves are expected to
engage only in the activities which we would associate with
the first part of the hermeneutic circle. However, public
discourse in the communitarian perception differs from the
hermeneutic model in the following way. The hermeneutic
model of democracy expects that community dialogue will
produce sufficient consensus for the making of collective
choices. The communitarian version of democracy anticipates
the reverse: that consensus grounded in shared
understandings will produce public dialogue which will
uncover areas of agreement; persuasion is unnecessary and
choices will be obvious.

Democracy as Essential in the Communitarian Vision of the
Good Life
Surveying communitarian conceptions of citizenship and
community reveals that further distinctions are needed
regarding what the term "community" is being used to
convey.44 In order for community to provide the good life
and have a positive impact on its members, certain modes of
relating must characterize community life. The contemporary
communitarians under discussion clearly suggest, but stop
44 This observation applies to the contemporary authors as well
as Rousseau, Burke, and Hegel.
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short of explicitly delineating, democratic processes. On
closer inspection, it thus becomes evident that what makes
community good, for communitarians, is that shared
understandings are utilized to promote the first facet of
hermeneutic democracy. Specifically, we find the assumption
that community discourse suggests a democratic political
arrangement because it includes the discourse intended to
guide decisions on proximate issues.
"Community," as used by communitarians, has two
distinct connotations. These meanings can be differentiated
by asking whether the term is employed to endorse
recognition of the ubiquitous influence of communities in
contributing to the identity and perceptions of individuals,
or whether community positively impacts its members, and is
therefore associated with the good life. In the latter case,
communitarians rely on the inclusion of the first portion of
the circle of hermeneutic democracy to explain the
advantages of community.
If community membership is beneficial and associated
with the good life we also find a specific type of political
functioning which is distinctively democratic, and carries
normative implications since it makes democracy the standard
for political processes. However, the antecedence of
community results in its reification; no space is created
for collective critical self-evaluation and indeed, there is
no analytical outlet for the examination of fundamental
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common meanings. We find little explanation by
communitarians of how democratic

processes emerge in

communities, or on what bases this type of functioning is
legitimated. The debate between communitarianism and liberal
individualism could only profit from greater clarity by
communitarians in defining what is meant by "community11 and
giving a more complete account of why community membership
is valuable to citizens.
To unravel this one step further, we see that there is
an aspect of community, which is antecedent to democracy.
Congenial relationships between community members is the
facet of community life which furthers democratic-style
functioning. Communitarian citizens exhibit mutual respect
and concern.45 The result is the capacity for amicable
relations between citizens which in turn facilitates
democracy. The type of democratic discourse which
communitarians envision is facilitated by, and indeed,
predicated upon, filial attachments.
Viewing the debate between communitarians and liberal
individualists from the vantage point of democracy
highlights their common dependence on democracy but
differences in the reasons for including it. Communitarians
depict polities made up of agreeable citizens. Shared
understandings conduce toward community congeniality, but we
45 It is not entirely clear whether there is an antecedent
variable which produces these filial bonds, or whether they are a
consequence of community living.
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find few specifics on how communal political decisions are
made and carried out. Oblique references to discursive and
deliberative processes create an impression of smoothlyfunctioning communities. Ostensibly, communities are
grounded in philia, and therefore have the capacity to build
on fundamental shared understandings in order to make
practical collective decisions. Moreover, the assumption of
democratic functioning by communitarians lends an aura of
legitimacy to the exercise of political authority,

(whatever

form that authority may take).46
Compatibility, which paves the way for democratic
cooperation is apparent in communitarian precepts. The
concept of the socially-constituted self and a capacity for
harmonious relationships are consistently linked. The
sequence of causation is, first, socially-constructed selves
living as citizens in communities, second, the capacity for
concordant relations, and third, collective discourse and
deliberation suggesting functioning democracy. For example,
Charles Taylor argues that since "participatory selfgovernment is itself usually carried out in common actions,
it is normal to see it as animated by common

46 By contrast, the polity portrayed by liberal individualists
relies on the consent of citizens to grease the wheels of
democracy. Self-interested utility maximizers each acting to
fulfill their own preferences, come together under the auspices of
democratic procedures in order to negotiate the allocation of goods
and negotiation of disagreements. This will be discussed in Part
II.

51
identifications.1’47 In this instance, the effect of placing
the community prior to the individual is evident in the
association of "common action" with "participatory"
governance.
Walzer clearly assumes that members of the political
community, as the citizen body, are making collective
decisions.48 Near the end of Spheres of Justice, important
goods have been divided along appropriate distributive
patterns in differentiated "spheres of justice." At this
point, democracy, as an institutional arrangement, seems to
win affirmation by default, because it is most likely to
permit the needed distinctions between social goods,
Once we have located ownership, expertise,
religious knowledge, and so on in their proper
places and established their autonomy, there is no
alternative to democracy in the political sphere.
The only thing that can justify undemocratic
forms of government is an undifferentiated
conception of social goods...49
According to Michael Sandel, affinity with democracy is
something which communitarians, rather than liberals, should
rightfully claim because functioning democracy depends on a
sense of community. Sandel argues that the alliance between
47 Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian
Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 170.
48 From the chapter on "Membership": "Are citizens bound to
take in strangers?.. .Let us assume that the citizens have no formal
obligations.... Citizens can make some selection among necessitous
strangers...." Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1983), 45.
49 Ibid. , 303.
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liberal individualism and democracy is uneasy at best
because liberals' association with democracy is grounded in
an instrumental utilitarianism. The liberal regime exhibits,
...two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its
philosophy: first, a tendency to crowd out
democratic possibilities? second, a tendency to
undercut the kind of community on which it
nonetheless depends.50
In describing the model of society envisioned by
communitarians, Charles Taylor assumes "collective goals,"
as well as deliberation, because "the nature of

the good

[for the community] requires that it be sought for in
common."51 Similarly to other communitarians, Taylor
assumes citizens may belong to several associations, each of
which is a community. As long as the allegiances appropriate
to each community, and the demands made of members by each
community do not conflict, multiple memberships create no
discord. Regarding relations between sub-groups and the
nation, there is an issue which distinguishes Taylor from
other communitarians. Taylor takes up the issue of the
potential for tension to arise for citizens because of

50 This passage continues: "Where liberty in the early republic
was understood as a function of democratic institutions and
dispersed power, liberty in the procedural republic is defined in
opposition to democracy, as an individual's guarantee against what
the majority might will." Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural
Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory. 12 (February
1984): 93-94.
51 Charles
Taylor,
"The
Politics
of Recognition,"
in
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann
and Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
59.

53
multiple memberships in diverse communities. The nation
state is the likely source of this tension if it is
unwilling to permit sub-groups to retain and nurture the
features which set them apart.
In the work of Alisdair MacIntyre, the "arguments11
regarding the relative importance of goods within specific
communities imply democracy,
Moreover when a tradition is in good order it is
always partially constituted by an argument about
the goods the pursuit of which gives to that
tradition its particular point and
purpose....Traditions, when vital, embody
continuities of conflict.52
MacIntyre grounds his philosophical positions in a
teleological perspective, where telos is understood in terms
of morality and virtue. MacIntyre has a strong affinity for
Aristotle and the capacity of the Athenian polis to serve as
the context for forming the shared understandings which in
turn encourage virtue and morality. However, these
affinities are not accompanied by an acknowledgement of the
political processes which provide the community with the
ability to engage in constructive "argument" and productive
"conflict." The discourse in MacIntyre's community does not
qualify as democratic because the dialogue does not
incorporate differing moral perspectives, and no persuasion
is taking place. Ostensibly, the views of those with
superior insight will prevail, and conflict will be confined
52 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue
University Press, 1981), 206.

(Notre Dame: Notre Dame
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to the ordering of goods, rather than their nature. In
short, this is a superficial and abbreviated view of
democracy because the seemingly democratic processes do not
create a space for deliberative distance by which to foster
collective self-understanding or critical self-appraisal.

The Communitarian Citizen and the Good Life
As we have seen, community for communitarians is more
than an escape from the dangers of the state of nature, and
more than a means of collectively acquiring the necessities
of life through the division of labor. Community is the
condition and means of living the good life.53 For
adherents

of liberal individualism, the self is initially

conceived

as outside of society. In thiscondition humans

are free, in that they are autonomous and rational moral
agents. The challenge is how to maintain and maximize
freedom once individuals have entered society, and how to do
so fairly. The political community, especially in the form
of the state, poses a potential threat to the freedom and
just treatment of citizens. As we have seen, from the

53 How might a communitarian citizen expect the community to
nurture the conditions of the good life? The citizen could expect
the community to advance the shared understandings and traditions
upon which the community is founded. This may include education of
youth in the heritage of the community, and
public events which
recall and rehearse such traditions. In addition, the citizen
anticipates that as the overarching community, the nation-state,
will provide for freedom to sustain distinctive sub-communities.
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communitarian standpoint, being outside the political
community would alienate a person from the means of living
the good life. Because humans are social creatures,
philosophical grounding does not originate with hypothetical
pre-social anthropology. It is the community that creates
the context for the good life because it is within the
political community that freedom and justice are
conceptualized and experienced.
Walzer's concern with the community's capacity to
facilitate the good life focuses on just distribution. The
community is the context for citizens' decisions on how
goods should be allocated within their respective spheres.
The most significant collective choice for the community is
how to distribute citizenship,
The primary good that we distribute to one another
is membership in some human community. And what we
do with regard to membership structures all our
other distributive choices: it determines with
whom we make those choices, from whom we require
obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate
goods and services.54
The next goal is to identify a principle capable of guiding
the community toward just decisions. The principle which
Walzer feels best fulfills this requisite is Rawls' maxim of
mutual aid.55
54 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice
Inc., 1983), 31.

(New York: Basic Books

55 Very simply, the principle of mutual aid is the "duty to
do something good for another...." Like other natural duties, the
principle of mutual aid is "derived from a contractarian point of
view," and applies "not only to definite individuals, say to those
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Having established the importance of just distribution,
(and basing this on the principle of mutual aid), Walzer
turns to practical questions the political community will
have to address: "Whom should we admit? Ought we to have
open admissions? Can we choose among applicants? What are
the appropriate criteria?"56 An important feature of
communitarianism is illustrated here: the self-understanding
of the community will be reflected in the criteria by which
choices are made on applications for admission. Citizens’
collective self-understanding is the theoretic basis for
these criteria.
The choice of practical criteria would be preceded by
questions such as: What are the most important aspects of
our commonality? What are the shared understandings which
form the foundation of our community?

How is the community

evolving, and what do we see as the best course for the

cooperating together in a particular social arrangement, but to
persons generally." In Section 51 Rawls explains the Kantian roots
of the principle of mutual aid, citing The Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals. Please see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 114-15 and 338.
Liberal aspects of Walzer's communitarianism are evident here.
First is the use of Rawls at a pivotal juncture. More importantly,
Rawls’ principle of mutual aid is based on contract. This suggests
Walzer's acceptance of the need for contract and consent in order
to explain the community cohesion necessary to make collective
decisions. The contrast here with other communitarians is the
apparent requisite of a justification for this cohesion, rather
than depicting it as an expected by-product of the community
itself. (We might note this as an additional substantiation of
Walzer's designation as a liberal communitarian.)
56 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1983), 32.
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future? Are there specific needs evident in the community
potential that new members could help meet? Could an
applicant possess a characteristic which would be
disruptive, or somehow detrimental to the community? Those
possessing citizenship must decide:
"We who are already in the community do the
choosing, in accordance with our own understanding
of what membership means in our community and of
what sort of a community we want to have.
Membership as a social good is constituted by our
understanding. . . ."57
This gives further credence to the contention that it is not
only community, but democracy, that is crucial to the good
life. Criteria for membership reflect the self-understanding
of the community to the extent that such decisions are made
democratically.
For MacIntyre and Sandel the capacity for citizens to
live the good life depends both on politics within the self
and the politics of the community, and that there be
symmetry between them. The view of the individual and the
community are consonant in that the organization and
internal workings of the individual are a mirror image of
the organization and internal workings of the community.58
57 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1980), 32.
58 Use of a model which exhibits this type of resonance between
the individual citizen and the community is one of the reasons for
the association made between contemporary communitarianism and
Platonic and Aristotelian thought. Interestingly, Sandel gives no
indication that community deliberation will produce unity of
opinion. The benefits of community which conduce toward the good
life include connectedness through dialogue, although dialogue does
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According to MacIntyre, the community does not intrinsically
conduce toward the good life unless the community is wellordered. The question then becomes: what is it that makes
the community well-ordered? MacIntyre's response is the
capacity of the community to provide a "context" for the
"language of morality,"
From within and only from within a given polis,
[the citizen is] already provided with an ordering
of goods, goods to be achieved by excellence
within specific and systematic forms of activity,
integrated into an overall rank order by the
political activity of those particular
citizens. . . ,59
In short, the well-ordered community facilitates the
good life by providing the individual with the means and
not necessarily result in consensus. Nor does Sandel prioritize
justice as a characteristic or by-product of community. On these
points Sandel differs from the more idealized vision of community
of Alisdair MacIntyre, who assumes consensus and emphasizes
justice. The polis is the archetype of a community for MacIntyre,
hence, the good life in the community is explicated by referring to
Aristotle. The pivotal citation referred to by MacIntyre is, "The
virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the
arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice
decides what is just." Aristotle, Politics. 1253a29. The phrase
"political association," denotes the framework or organization of
the association that takes the form of a polis. Aristotle,
Politics, with notes by Trevor J. Saunders, 61. MacIntyre's esteem
for the polis, and use of the term to describe the ideal of
community is evident, "For the polis is human community perfected
and completed by achieving its telos...." Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?. 97.
59 Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality, 133.
The skills associated with citizenship relate to assessment of the
goods (i.e. virtues), which when possessed by citizens, will
contribute to the community, "Those who participated...would need
to develop different types of evaluative practice. On the one hand
they would need to value...those qualities of mind and character
which would contribute to the realisation of their common good or
goods." Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1981), 141.
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motivation for the pursuit of goods,

(understood here by

MacIntyre as virtues).60 The pursuit of virtue is a
community-specific activity. Even though "all faiths and all
evaluations are equally non-rational; all are subjective
directions given to sentiment and feeling,"61 the community
is the starting point for any moral enquiry including the
search for "the good."62
For Sandel, the good life of a citizen hinges on the
definition and re-definition of the self available through
interaction. This raises the issue of democracy as it
pertains to political membership. The politics of the
intrasubjective self are a microcosm of the politics of
60 In addition, justice is a condition of the well-ordered
community. For MacIntyre, justice is crucial to the community as
the context for the good life. Similarly to an Aristotelian
perspective, justice is not only a product of institutional
arrangements but a quality of the well-ordered community itself.
As MacIntyre points out, ". . .justice is the norm by which the polis
is ordered, a norm which lacks application apart from the polis."
Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1988), 97. In short, an individual
separate from the community is deprived of the capacity for
justice. Conversely, the individual within a community based on a
shared moral conceptions gains an understanding of justice, and
rightfully expects just treatment from the community.
61 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue
University Press, 1981), 25.

(Notre Dame: Notre Dame

62 "... [T]he self has to find its moral identity in and through
it membership in communities [but this] does not entail that the
self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of
those forms of community. Without these moral particularities to
begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in
moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good
consists." Ibid., 2 05. For a further exposition of Aristotle on the
good life and implications for community functioning please see
Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1988), 96-123.
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deliberative democracy. On both levels, democratic discourse
is depicted since each identity has a voice and potential
impact. In Sandel, the intrasubjective self is to the
citizen as the intersubjective citizen is to the community.
Most importantly, it is the communal aspects of identity
which permit joint reasoning, or collective deliberation. In
the words of Sandel,
For persons encumbered in part by a history they
share with others, knowing oneself...is less a
strictly private thing. To take seriously such
deliberation is to allow that my friend may grasp
something I have missed, may offer a more adequate
account of the way my identity is engaged in the
alternatives before me.63
As we have seen, with regard to the citizen and the
good life, the discourses carried on in the context of
community have an enlarging and enriching effect on
individual citizens and the collectivity. Because a portion
of each member's identity is shared, the notion of "selfinterest" is expanded to include the interests of the
community. Contemporary communitarians build here on an
expansive version of self-interest similar to that
articulated by Rousseau. The good life is a provision of
community because the communal identity permits citizens to
transcend an individualistic and autonomous conception of

63 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 181.
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self-interest.64

In addition, the communitarian version of

democracy transcends political conflict with the assumption
that pre-existent shared understandings will produce
consensus, and by restricting democratic processes to only
the first half of the hermeneutic circle.
Walzer, Sandel, Taylor, Miller and MacIntyre all assume
that citizenship will be meaningful because of citizen
involvement.65 Collective self-understandings are formed
when citizens participate in the articulation of consensual
understandings.66

As we have noted, these communitarians

all hesitate to make distinctions between the leaders and
the led, and between the social and public on one hand, and
the political on the other. Community as a facilitator of

64 For example, "...[H]e, [the citizen] cannot regard politics
merely as an arena in which to pursue his private interests. He
must act as a citizen, that is as a member of a collectivity who is
committed to advancing its common good." David Miller, "Community
and Citizenship," in Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo
Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), 96.
65 "Citizenship...is not just
a matter
of
possessing
rights.... The citizen has to see himself as playing an active role
in determining his society*s future, and as taking responsibility
for
the collective decisions that
are made." David Miller,
"Community and Citizenship," in Communitarianism and Individualism,
ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 96.
66 "The crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally
dialogical character.... But we learn these modes of expression
through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages
needed for self-definition on their own." Please note the influence
here of Hegel. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann
and Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
32.
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the good life presupposes that belonging will be a positive
experience when citizens are members of communities and
nation-states which derive their legitimacy from the citizen
involvement. It is democracy, poorly-articulated but clearly
suggested, which these notable communitarians use to
explicate the ability of community to provide the good life.

Democracy is the element which permits the community to
be set in motion. Each aspect of community can be described
in a static condition, but it is democracy which provides
the dynamic for effectual functioning. Recall the
implications of the constructivist epistemology: as the self
is constituted by community membership, the community is
constituted by the manner in which its citizens interpret
and understand it. The self and the community are
reciprocally constituted and their meanings are mutually
reinforcing within given communities. These meanings are in
an ongoing state of flux, and the flux is expressed through
discourse which communitarians opt to describe in terms of
democracy. However, according to a hermeneutic model of
democracy, a given community could only be considered
democratic if both of these meanings are continually
scrutinized and redefined. The shared understandings of
communitarianism guide proximate decisions, but the insight
and perspective gained are not utilized to challenge these
collective values nor to redefine the communityfs self
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understanding.
Considering the citizen and the good life underscores
the two meanings given to community by communitarians. The
first is an ambiguous and reified notion of community. The
primary value of this idealized community regarding the good
life, is its capacity to afford a sense of solidarity and
belonging. But contemporary philosophy and current events
suggest that community this loosely conceived is not
necessarily associated with the good life. It is in fact
vulnerable to criticism on the bases of hypernationalism,
exclusionary chauvinism and forced collectivism. The
communitarians we have considered reflect a subtle, but
crucial distinction between community, undefined beyond
these basics, and community capable of serving as the
context for the good life. It is my contention that the
component of democracy, understood as the first half of the
circle of hermeneutic processes, is the feature which
permits differentiation between community as a romanticized
political and social association, and community which does
in fact afford opportunities for the good life.

Chapter II:
The Self and Citizen of Liberal Individualism

The History of Conceptions of the Liberal Individualist Self
The long and diverse tradition of liberal individualism
has resulted in an ideology so broad it often seems capable
of incorporating both sides of many political philosophy
debates. However, the views of liberal individualists and
communitarians on the sources of the identity of the self,
citizenship, and the nature of democracy, are distinct to
the point of being mutually exclusive. These disparities
result from contrasting views of the self. Moreover, these
differences produce the emphasis by communitarians on the
first half of the hermeneutic circle, and the emphasis by
liberal individualists on the second. By placing the
individual antecedent to the community, liberal
individualists are compelled to stress the autonomy of the
self as an agent, over the cohesion of community, and to
anticipate a profusion of differing opinions on every
political and social issue, rather than to expect consensus.
The liberal individualist self is a philosophical
construct which has its genesis in some form of state of
nature theory. The preferences and interests of this self
are formed prior to entering society; it is the uniqueness
64
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of these preferences, combined with the capacity for choice,
upon which the dignity and value of this person are founded.
The rights of this self are inalienable because they are
prepolitical, having been derived from the state of nature.
Upon entering society, the individuated self will have
little in common with others, but may choose to join with
fellow citizens to pursue specific goals which further
his/her interests. Liberal individualists expect that the
individual will challenge the polity if it wrongly assumes
that he/she concurs with its premises or decisions. The
liberal individualist self is oriented toward finding
fulfillment in the private sphere, and toward selective
involvement in the public realm when it suits his/her
purposes.
To observe the elements of liberal individualism most
pertinent to citizenship and democracy, the influence of
three exemplars will be considered. The first is the
contractarian perspective, as outlined in the work of John
Locke. Second, is the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill;
and third, is deontological, as founded in Immanuel Kant.
Each of these represent liberal individualist views of the
self, of who and what a citizen is, as well as of the rights
and responsibilities associated with citizenship.
These three are important representatives of liberal
individualism because, as we shall see, their premises and
methodology have demonstrated lasting influence. The
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centrality of the contract in the founding of society
remains evident in the thought of John Rawls, Judith Shklar,
and Robert Nozick. John Stuart Mill's emphasis on individual
liberty, the validity of diverse opinions, and maximization
of the public good has impacted Ronald Dworkin, Friedrich
Hayek, Robert Nozick, T.M. Scanlon, and Judith Shklar, among
others. Immanuel Kant's model of the highly individuated
self whose reason makes him/her a discerner of universal law
is apparent in the premises of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin
and Amy Gutmann.
In Lockean contractarianism, the citizen becomes a part
of the political community by consenting to the social
contract. Joining the political community is a logical and
pragmatic decision for the individual because "civil
government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of
the state of nature."67 Locke explicates the universal
aspects of human nature in the depiction of a state of
nature which is social, but without government.68 The
67 John Locke,
Two Treatises of Government
(New York:
MacMillan, 1947), 127. The state of nature is inconvenient indeed
since each person has the right to judge and to punish. In the
absence of impartial judges, justice is administered by aggrieved
parties, resulting in biased, personal judgments, retributive
justice, and "violence." Ibid., 126-28.
68 Ibid., "Of the State of Nature," Chapter 2, 122-28.
Responsibilities of citizenship include: desisting from violation
of the rights of other citizens, recognizing the supreme power of
civil society in the legislative authority of the government.
Ibid., 188-94. In the event that the government should become
tyrannical, the citizens make an "appeal to Heaven." This entails
initiating a citizen revolution, dissolving the government, and
founding a new government. Ibid., 131, 207, 224-25, 228-47.
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primary right of the individual who becomes a citizen via
the social contract is physical security, the chief benefit
is protection of private property.
That his precepts are reified by the assumption of
their timelessness is apparent in Locke's initial assertion
that there is a human condition common to all mankind, "To
understand political power right...we must consider what
state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of
perfect freedom...."69 This premise is also evident in the
closing paragraph of Two Treatises on Civil Government when
Locke explains that the transaction between the individual
and the community, the contract, is a permanent
agreement.70 Since these are not actual people making an
explicit contract, but imagined people giving hypothetical
tacit consent, the contract is not bound to time by the life
span of individuals or generations, but carries on endlessly
into the future.
The tenets of utilitarianism which have influenced
69 Ibid. , 122.
70 "To conclude, the power that every individual gave the
society when he entered into it can never revert to the individuals
again...but will always remain in the community, because without
this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary
to the original agreement...". This passage illustrates two
additional points:
first, what the individual gives to the
community through the contract is power, and second, the community
is an entity which may or may not exist, but cannot exist without
the
contract.
Note
the
difference
between
this
view
and
communitarianism. Communitarians include the possibility that a
particular individual may be within a community or outside of any
community, but the prospect of the absence of community is not
considered viable. Please see Ibid., 246.
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liberal individualism are oriented toward the capacity of
the principle of "moral utility" to guide individual and
collective action. Also referred to as the "greatest
happiness principle," the principle states, "actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."71 This
standard becomes the source of "rules and precepts for human
conduct." In a manner similar to Locke, the utilitarian
"standard of morality" is applied in the broadest possible
context: "the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard
of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own
happiness," but the happiness of "all mankind," and "the
whole sentient creation."72
The individual citizen's most valuable asset is an
understanding of the principle of utility since it is the
unimpeachable guide for every circumstance of life,
including how to live in a political community.73 Mill
claims that the utility principle is in itself sufficient
for the adjudication of all moral and political decisions.
71 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1987), 16.
72 Ibid. , 22, 28.
73 Because utility
is the
"ultimate
source
of moral
obligations, [it] may be invoked to decide between them when their
demands are incompatible." Ibid., 28. Clearly, the principle of
utility is a priori to all others, including that of moral
obligations. Although, John Stuart Mill deals here with the
possibility of competitive and mutually exclusive moral choices,
the potential for competition between incommensurable alternatives
is not broached.
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For the citizen, moral obligations derive from the principle
of utility, and conversely, it is the principle of utility
to which citizens are obligated. The salient implication
here is that citizens do not bear a moral obligation to the
community in the sense of the collective other, nor to
traditional beliefs of the community.
The first responsibility of citizenship is not to
deprive others of "personal liberty, property, or any other
thing which belongs to another by law."74 The primary right
of citizenship is the "right to equality of treatment."75
Although derived on dissimilar bases these tenets are
obviously compatible with those of Locke. The primary duty
the utilitarian state is to act as the agent which will
facilitate the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
For Mill, this is best accomplished by a state founded on
respect for individual liberty.76 It is significant that
M i l l fs endorsement of liberty is subordinate to the summum
bonum of utilitarianism: the protection of liberty is
instrumental because liberty is a means not an end; the only

74 Ibid.,

59.

75 Ibid.,

82.

76 Unlike Locke, this is
not a liberty grounded
in natural
rights derived from state ofnature
theory."Society
is not founded
on a contract, and no good purpose is answered by inventing a
contract in order to deduce social obligations from it; everyone
who receives the protection of society owes a return for the
benefit and...should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct
toward the rest." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin,
1974), 141.
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end and reference point being the "greatest happiness
principle.11
Mill's presentation of utilitarianism as a "science of
morals"77 has profound epistemological implications. Mill
argues for the superiority of utilitarianism by claiming
that it is scientific. As a science, utilitarianism makes
several claims, the first of which is infallibility. Second,
as in all science, truth is objective and discoverable.
Mill's project is to take a discovered truth (i.e. the
principle of utility), and ascribe to it the stature of
Truth, as understood in the natural sciences. This Truth is
then useable in the political and social realms. There is a
notable contrast here with communitarian epistemology in
which principles applied in the social realm would be
considered subjective, contextual and created, rather than
objective, universal and discoverable.
Kantian deontology is spawned in a world of solitary
individuals; similarly to contractarianism, deontological
liberal individualism requires explicit construction of an
individual. Kant's self is an ideal of a human being,
although he/she is plagued by a person whom Kant believes
has "inclinations" which are certainly other than

77 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1987), 11. Mill divides previous philosophies into the categories
of inductive and intuitive. Utilitarianism, by contrast, has a very
distinguished inception: citing a Platonic dialogue, Mill relates
that utilitarianism was taught to Socrates by Protagoras. Ibid.,
10.
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constructive. In the social and political contexts, the
dilemmas which Kant deals with are largely created by the
propensities of this base, or natural man.78
The Kantian dichotomization of the self raises the
issue of whether it will be noble or base man who serves as
the model for the citizen. Kant never resolves this
question, although the citizen as natural man is obviously a
predominant consideration in the design of robust state
institutions, and his strong endorsement of citizen
compliance with the rule of law. It appears that the higher
self is the author of laws which exercise control over the
lower self. On one hand, the Kantian self is a rational
being, appearing prior to the advent of society, and is a
discerner and maker of universal law. However, this
individual, as a citizen, experiences conflict with other
citizens in day-to-day dealings, and behaves in a less than
civil manner,
Man is an animal which, if it lives among others of its
kind, requires a master...who will break his will and
force him to obey a will that is universally valid,
under which each can be free.79
78 Please see Immanuel Kant, Conjectural Beginning of Human
History, Idea for a Universal History, and Perpetual Peace.
79 Ibid., 17. After emphasizing the need for an entity capable
of establishing and maintaining order, Kant reveals that the
solution to this dilemma is strong societal law. Kant asserts that
inevitable societal dissension will be the catalyst which nurtures
the development of human potential, "The means employed by Nature
to bring about the development of all the capacities of men is
their antagonism in society." Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal
History," in On History, ed. Lewis Beck (New York: MacMillan,
1963), 15.

72
A similar dichotomization of human nature is evident in
Locke's explication of the need for societal,

(i.e."known")-,

law,
First, there wants an established, settled, known law,
received and allowed by common consent to the standard
of right and wrong...for though the law of nature be
plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet
men, being biased by their interest as well as
ignorant... are not apt to allow of it as a law binding
to them. . . .80
The validity of the law of nature is derived from the fact
that it is self-evident truth. The hypothetical "rational"
person would grasp it, although actual individuals are
biased and ignorant, and therefore likely to miss it. The
"great law of nature" is: 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed'."81 It is clear that the human
being must be removed from the realm of the law of nature,
and moved to civil society, where the state administers the
laws. For these three classical liberal individualists, the
model of the self with both an higher and lower nature is
the prototype of the citizen. Examining this model of the
self offers insight into liberal individualism's need for
democracy. Democracy offers to liberal individualism a
political arrangement which will reinforce the nobler
inclinations of the self, and buffer the effects of
separateness and isolation. Higher man is capable of using

80 John Locke, Two
MacMillan, 1947), 184.
81 Ibid., 12 6.

Treatises

of

Government.

(New

York:
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reason to create appropriate laws, but concerns regarding
the man of base nature are evident in the design of
institutions, and the outlining of procedures for the
mediation of controversy.
These observations on the dichotomization of the self
set the stage for what we earlier referred to as the central
problem of citizenship for liberal individualists. The model
of the autonomous self is a being who is not only unique,
/

but alienated. The individual opinions of this self are
validated by grounding them in a presocial condition. This
means that the individuality of the self is substantiated by
how little he/she has in common with others. Only the
rhetorical tools of contract and consent are capable of
transforming this model of the self into a citizen. The
central problem of citizenship for liberal individualists is
this tension between autonomous individuals with their
diverse interests, and the polity which must not only guard
individual liberty, but maintain order by compelling
citizens to comply with the rule of law. This tension is
evident in the thought of Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Kant.82
82 The difficulties associated with transposing the highly
individuated self into a citizen are apparent in Mill's On Liberty.
For example, "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind
would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." Later
in the text, Mill goes on to warn: "No one pretends that actions
should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose
their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed
are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation
to some mischievous act." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London:
Penguin, 1974), 76, 119. Locke and Kant also encounter and deal
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The dichotomization of the self by liberal
individualists is further indication of the reification of
the self, particularly the "higher self." By making the
individuated self the first principle for all theory,
liberal individualists overlook both the antecedent
variables in the constitution and identity of the self, as
well as the consequences using the self as the point of
inception. This observation, in the inverse, can be made
regarding communitarians: by claiming the community as prior
to the individual and using it as the groundwork for theory,
communitarians overlook the antecedent factors in the
composition of a community, and the consequences of making
the community the foundation of all tenets. I would suggest
that the reification of the self by liberal individualists,
and of community by communitarians precludes the immanence
and reality of democratic processes and political conflict,
and the complementarity and dynamism produced by both halves
of the hermeneutic circle functioning in a mutuallyreinforcing balance.
The communitarian conception of citizenship is premised
on theoretical and practical particularism,

as well as an

absence of universality with regard to either "truths" or
with the resolution of this tension. On Locke, please compare
Chapter 2, "Of the State of Nature," of The Second Treatise on
Government, with Chapter 18, "Of Tyranny," where Locke asserts:
"Wherever law ends tyranny begins." Ibid., 224. Regarding Kant,
consider the contrast between the idealized self of "The Groundwork
of the Metaphysic of Morals," with the self as a citizen in "Idea
for a Universal History," and "Perpetual Peace."
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prescriptives. By contrast, Locke, Mill and Kant, as well as
contemporary liberal individualists convey principles and
prescriptives intended to transcend time and space. Whereas
communitarian ideological authority and applicability rest
on the claim of a realistic representation of human nature
and associative life, liberal individualist claims of
authority and applicability are grounded in an appeal to
universal truth.83
References to "rational men" illustrate the technique
used in order to substantiate the validity of the "truths11
being conveyed. "Rational men" are used as the foil by which
to affirm the reasonableness of basic assumptions, thereby
creating an impression of consensus. Rather than speaking in
the first person these liberal individualists present their
premises and principles as those on which rational men would

83 According to these three traditional liberal individualists,
reason is the source of universal truth, "Men living together
according to reason, without a common superior on earth with
authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature."
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: MacMillan,
1947), 130; please see also Ibid., 124-26. "No one can be a great
thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first
duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead."
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1974), 95. "But
between him and that imagined place of bliss, restless reason would
interpose itself,
irresistibly impelling him to develop the
faculties implanted within him. It would not permit him to return
to that crude and simple state from which it had driven him to
begin with." Immanuel Kant, "Conjectural Beginnings of Human
History," in On History, ed. Lewis Beck (New York: MacMillan,
1963), 59.
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agree.84 The logical converse of this is an important
epistemological point: agreement becomes the standard of
rationality— if the hearer is rational, he/she will
concur.85
With regard to the debate between communitarianism and
liberal individualism, these premises profoundly influence
conceptions of citizenship and community. For liberal
individualists, citizenship and community, like truth, exist
in a realm beyond time. Is the epistemology of liberal
individualism pitched at a higher level of abstraction than
that of communitarianism? With regard to theoretical
foundations grounded in claims of transcendent truth, the
response must be affirmative. The epistemology of
communitarians is however, highly abstracted, as evidenced
in the reliance on models of community which are idealized

84 Locke
illustrates
the premise
that
reason
affords
understanding of the most basic law, that is, the law of nature,
while adding as a caveat the possibility that due to the base
nature, persons may not be consistently capable of adhering to this
law, "Though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest as well
as ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to allow of it as
a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular
cases." John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York:
MacMillan, 1947), 184.
85 Michael
Oakeshott
explains
the
connection
between
individualism and liberal rationalism as deriving from the
"Rationalist" setting him/herself as the gauge of appropriate
thought: "[the Rationalist]... is something of an individualist,
finding it difficult to believe that anyone who can think honestly
and clearly will
think differently from himself." Michael
Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," in Rationalism in Politics
and Other Essays. (London: Metheun and Company, Ltd., 1969), 2.

77
or wholly imagined.86

The Liberal Individualist Self as the Prototype for the
Citizen
The self constructed presocially and prepolitically is
the cornerstone of liberal individualist conceptions of the
citizen. In a contractarian model, the self is a priori to
society and community87, the needs and desires of the self
86 Instances here include: Sandel's communities of sociallyconstituted persons, MacIntyre's eras of thought and tradition
which appear as communities,
(for MacIntyre, the dialogue of
philosophy is the discourse between different eras of thought), and
Walzer's
spheres
of justice where meanings are
internally
established and context specific. A recent text which examines
potential negative implications of imagined communities is Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism. Examples of historical communities, used by
the communitarian authors cited in this essay include fifth-century
Athens,
medieval
Europe,
and
colonial
America.
Liberal
individualist critics charge that these three historical examples
do not qualify as "communities." On this point, please see Derek
Phillips, Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian
Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Phillips
argues: "The historical prevalence of the kind of community they
describe is a fiction. It rests on a myth that looks to the past
for reassurance and guidance." Ibid., 150. The disagreement here
highlights the differences in the epistemological grounding of
liberal individualists relative to that of communitarians. From the
standpoint of communitarians, historical veracity may not be
crucial.
The interpretevistic epistemology of communitarians
suggests that the purposes of the "histories" for communities may
be somewhat mythologic, in that they are valued for their capacity
to provide sentiments of rootedness and commonality.
87 In the language of liberal individualism, the term "society"
often describes the collectivity of persons linked together through
social,
economic
or
political
ties.
In
the
language
of
communitarian ism, the word "community" is used in an analogous
manner, although the word carries slightly different connotations.
In my view, the choice of the word "community" by communitarians
indicates a desire to emphasize the collegial aspects of collective
relationships over the ostensibly depersonal implications of the
word "society," as used by liberal individualists. For the purpose
of
clarity,
I
use
the
words
"society"
and
"community"

78
having been formed in the state of nature. The consequence
is a self as the citizen endowed with inalienable rights
derived from the presocial realm, but which the state must
protect.88 In utilitarian models, the individual self is
the basis for the model citizen because the individual is
the source of preferences, the fulfillment of which conduce
to happiness.89 The responsibility of the community and/or
state vis-a-vis citizens is to aggregate these preferences
and use them to guide policy.
As we have seen, the self of deontological ethics is
shaped by presocial propensities which are both positive and
negative. Once in community, the self is transformed into a
citizen through recognition of his/her capacity for
morality, and adherence to societal law.90 The Kantian

interchangeably.
88 "Concern with rights is based largely on the warranted
supposition that we have significantly differing ideas of the good
and that we are interested in the freedom to put our own
conceptions into practice." T. M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and
Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 107.
89 "The only power deserving the name is that of governments
while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and
instincts of masses." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London:
Penguin, 1974), 131.
90 "To the Idea of freedom there is inseparably attached the
concept of autonomy, and to this in turn the universal principle of
morality. . . .We see now that when we think of ourselves as free, we
transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and
recognize the autonomy of the will together with its consequence—
morality...." Immanuel Kant, "A Critique of Pure Practical Reason,"
in The Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals (New York: Harper and
Row, 1964), 120-21.
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roots of this perspective, as well as the thought of
contemporary liberal individualists indicate that movement
from solitary individuality to citizenship, via the
contract, is a volitional act. This focuses two issues. The
first is the importance to human identity of the capacity
for choice. Second, community is not such by nature, but by
the aggregated effect of these acts.
The capacity for choice is highlighted when Rawlsian
individuals emerge from the isolation of the original
position to come together in communities. The priority of
the right over the good is determinative not only of the
capacity of the community to provide justice, but of how
individuals will view each other and the collectivity.91
The Rawlsian self as a citizen is vividly aware of his/her
obligations as a "moral person," and of the rights resulting
from autonomy,
[In] a plurality of persons... their fundamental
interest in liberty and in the means to make fair
use of it is the expression of their seeing
themselves as primarily moral persons with an
equal right to choose their mode of life.92
For our purposes, the emphasis on individuality is more
crucial than the implications for deontological morality. We
are here less interested in obligations derived from the
original position than in the place of the individual in the
91 "Now in justice as fairness [there is] the priority of right
and the Kantian interpretation." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 563.
92 Ibid., 563.
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Rawlsian model. In this regard, the significance of the
individual, as conceptualized here, cannot be over
estimated. The self outlined in the original position is for
Rawls,

"an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean

point for judging the basic structure of society."93 When
one considers the clarity of this statement combined with
the influence of Rawls over the past two and half decades,
inception of the term "liberal individualism" and genesis of
the debate in which we are engaged become clearer.
Individualism conceptually defines not only the terms
of justice, but more fundamentally, ontology, and therefore
the type

of theory that may be constructed.

what the

community may entail

Thetotality of

is predicated onthis

model

of

the self,
The essential idea is that we want to account for
the social values, for the intrinsic good of
institutional, community, and associative
activities, by a conception of justice that in its
theoretical basis is individualistic.94
This illustrates the mutual exclusivity of the communitarian
and liberal individualist conceptions of the self. In the
case of Rawls, the individuated self emerges from behind the
veil to become a member of the just society, and a citizen
of the redistributive state. There are other paths, however,
that the original self of liberal individualism may follow.
Robert Nozick grounds his theory of the minimal state
93 Ibid.,

584.

94 Ibid.,

264.
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in state of nature theory.95 The degree of individuation of
the self, combined with reliance on state of nature origins,
also results in a community that is created and artificial.
Nozick explains that the only promising way of
“understanding the whole political realm" is to "explain it
in terms of the nonpolitical."96 Notwithstanding obvious
differences, Rawls' self behind the veil, and Nozick1s self
in the state of nature, serve analogous purposes. The self
behind the veil is an autonomous self, stripped of all that
could prevent the making of rational choices. The self

in

Nozick1s state of nature is a unique being whose
separateness is the credential of his/her capacity as a
moral agent. Both selves are reified models used as first
principles, which consequently become determinative of

the

structure of community.97
The selves of Nozick, and of Rawls, as prototypes of
95 "A theory of a state of nature that begins with fundamental
general descriptions of morally permissible and impermissible
actions, and of deeply based reasons why some persons in any
society would violate these moral constraints...will serve our
explanatory purposes, even if no actual state ever arose that way."
Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
1974), 7.
96 Ibid. , 6.
97 For Nozick, it is the separateness of individuals which
precludes a community any more elaborate than the minimal state.
The stature and distinctiveness of this self indicate that there
are as many "highest goods" as there are people, "Why not hold that
some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons
more, for the sake of the overall social good? There is no social
entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.
There are only...different individual people with their own
individual lives." Ibid., 33.
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the citizen are not created with the capacity or need for
collective deliberation. If collective decisions are in
order, this citizen enters discourse with preferences and
opinions fully formed. Since the perspectives of the citizen
are formed pre-socially, neither the broadening of
viewpoints, nor persuasion, are objectives of political
processes. Community serves utilitarian purposes by offering
conveniences associated with the division of labor.98
Rawls' veil of ignorance and Nozick's state of nature theory
ascribe dignity to the self based on rationality, autonomy,
and uniqueness.
From the standpoint of communitarians, this is
unacceptable because it precludes the possibility of a self
capable of the bonds upon which the communities (of
communitarians) are built.99 Once again, this illustrates
the contrast between liberal individualists and
communitarians on the purposes and benefits of citizenship.

98 Ibid. , 33, 32.
The
contrast
between
liberal
individualists
and
communitarians on this point is drawn succinctly by Michael Sandel:
"What is denied to the unencumbered self, [that is, the liberal
individualist self], is the possibility of membership in any
community. . .where the self itself could be at stake. Such a
community— call it constitutive as against merely cooperative—
would engage the identity as well as the interests of the
participants, and so implicate its members in a citizenship more
thoroughgoing than the unencumbered self can know." Michael Sandel,
"The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political
Theory 12 (February 1984): 87. Also, please see Michael Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice
(New York:
Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 64.
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The liberal individualist self as a citizen has need of a
political community, in the form of a state, which offers
protection from the violation of his/her individual rights.
The communitarian self as a citizen needs the community in a
much more fundamental sense, since it is constitutive: the
community is an overriding variable in the formation of
his/her identity and capacity for choice. The antecedent
community provides a sense of belonging and grounding in
shared understandings which are the fundamental referents
necessary for both individual and collective choices. For
liberal individualists, society, community, and political
institutions are products of interaction between
individuals. For communitarians, community is natural, and
the self is a product of the positive and ineluctable
influence of community. Hence, community is crucial to the
identity and development of the self.
The dignity of the self of liberal individualism is
revealed in the individual's ability to formulate his/her
personal conception of the good.100 David Gauthier's self
constructed outside of community is similar to that of

100 For example, "The liberal individual has her own conception
of the good." David Gauthier,
"The Liberal Individual," in
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner
De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 154; also,
"The government must be neutral on what might be called the
question of the good life....Since the citizens of a society differ
in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals
if it prefers one conception to another...." Ronald Dworkin,
"Liberalism," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 127.
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Nozick and Stephen Macedo, in this important sense: The
possibility of a change in viewpoint occurs within the self,
rather than in the context of community,
The good of each person expresses her
preferences....Thus the liberal individual must
have the capacity to reflect on her preferences,
and to alter them in the light of reflection; this
capacity makes her autonomous.101
The influence of grounding theory in a view of individuals
in the state of nature, or behind the veil, is thus
clarified: the separateness of the self who is constituted
presocially is maintained after entrance into a community by
the uniqueness of individual conceptions of the good, which
in turn leads to autonomy of deliberation and reflection,
and individual opinions.
Relevant to our discussion this means that the
individual enters the social realm, including public
discourse, with opinions already formed. Therefore,
transformation of the perspectives of individuals is not one
of the purposes served by community. The pertinent issues
regarding public discourse are substantially different for
liberal individualists than for communitarians. For liberal
individualists, questions regarding what will transpire when
101
David
Gauthier,
"The
Liberal
Individual,"
in
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner
De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 154. In the
words of Macedo, "The ideal liberal personality is characterized by
reflective self-awareness, active self-control, a willingness to
engage in self-criticism, and openness to change, and critical
support for the public morality of liberal justice." Stephen
Macedo, Liberal Virtues, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990),
251.
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the dessemination of information and public dialogue occur
include how to encourage citizens to inform themselves,
deciding which topics ought to be on the agenda and why,
conflict resolution, and avoiding the tyranny of the
majority.
For liberal individualists, the initial animating
movement of theory is the movement from individuals in the
state of nature, or behind the veil, into society. The point
which best highlights the differences between liberal
individualist and communitarian selves, is that for liberal
individualists, this does not result in a self embedded in a
specific community of origin, but rather a conceptualization
of the self embedded in cosmopolitan society writ large. As
Amy Gutmann points out, "Rawls derives principles of
justice...from our identification with all free and rational
beings rather than with particular communities."102
One additional point on the individuated self as the
prototype for the citizen: agency and justification are both
grounded in the individual. Moreover the rights ascribed to
the citizen are inalienable because they are derived from
the model of the self in the presocial state of nature.
Therefore citizenship is a legally prescribed status. Basic
points of consensus are postulated on the premise that they

102 Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," in
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner
De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125.
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are issues on which reasonable people would agree.103 In
this schema, the individual is one of two possible agents,
the other being the state. With regard to the conception of
citizenship, the structure and purposes of political
institutions including citizenship, are justified using the
model of the self as the reference point.
The community is subordinate to the individual; when
the self joins society, the model of the self generates the
prototype of the citizen and the structure of political
institutions. The liberal individualist model of the self
generates theories of citizenship and democracy in which the
individual is equipped only to engage in the second half of
the hermeneutic process. Liberal individualism does not
provide for the creation of shared understandings, or
comprehension of what would explain their existence.
Consequently, fundamental agreements which serve as the
context for collective reasoning are in the form of codified
law. However, the liberal individualist citizen is oriented
toward a society which reflects a myriad of different
opinions. Indeed, the validity of these differences are
validated by the premises of the model of the self. Citizens
are geared toward evaluation of the polity relative to their
individual interests, and toward the critical appraisal of
areas of consensus, where these are impacting public policy.

103 John Rawls, A Theory
University Press, 1971), 16.
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The Liberal Individualist Conception of Citizenship
For liberal individualists, citizens are individuals
who leave the state of nature to join a polity. Accordingly,
citizenship is the formalization of ties between individuals
and the state, and is characterized as a status and a set of
rights. Primary issues of citizenship involve who may be a
citizen and what the rights of citizenship are. Normative
understandings determine the statutory arrangements that
guide adjudication when citizens’ pursuit of their interests
result in conflict.104 In addition, citizenship
institutionalizes the boundary between public and private
life, so that individuals may be protected from violation of
their rights by others or by the state, and be free to
pursue individual conceptions of the good life.105
As we have seen, the self of liberal individualism has

104 The prospect of conflict is clearly a concern of liberal
individualists. In the words of Ronald Dworkin, "citizens have
different
theories
of
the
good
and
hence
difference
preferences....The liberal, as lawgiver, now needs mechanisms to
satisfy the principles of equal treatment in spite of these
disagreements." Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Public and Private
Morality. ed.
Stuart
Hampshire
(Cambridge,
Eng:
Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 13 0. Rawls also anticipates conflict,
” [J]ustice is the virtue of practices where there are competing
interests and where persons feel entitled to press their rights on
each other." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press,
1971),
129.
For Rawls,
conflict may be
unavoidable, but adherence to the principles of justice provide a
matrix for adjudication and a fair outcome.
105 ” ...[T]he case for rights (or moral rules) is seen to rest
on their role in promoting maximum utility through the coordination
of individual action." T.M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and Fairness,"
in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge,
Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 106.
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a personal identity with preferences, interests, and the
ability to make appropriate choices. This helps explain why
the tenets of liberal society are rights-based and rulebased. Accordingly, the liberal individualist conception of
citizenship is oriented toward defining and defending the
rights of citizens and outsiders, and determining rules by
which this may be accomplished justly. If all individuals
have interests, and becoming the citizen of a state guards
those interests by transposing them to institutionalized
rights, accountability to these principles indicates that
states exhibit an openness toward those wishing to become
citizens.
Applying for citizenship is thus an action paralleling
the hypothetical picture of an individual seeking to
conclude a social contract with a state. This analogy is
based on a familiar liberal principle: the autonomy of all
individuals as rational moral agents is the basis for selfdetermination. When translated into policy terms, selfdetermination indicates freedom of migration. As we are
seeing, this raises specific questions, such as, on what
grounds can liberal states control immigration and limit
access to citizenship? Since the tenet of the autonomy of
individuals is applied universally rather than selectively,
this issue is unavoidable.
When unemployment and inter-ethnic tensions are low,
the potential for conflict between the individual autonomy
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principle and the corresponding policy of openness to
immigration may not be apparent. However, in the United
States and Western Europe, unemployment, the need for fiscal
restraint, and resurgent nationalism are giving rise to
calls by interest groups and political parties to curb
immigration. This situation is fueling the debate between
liberal individualism and communitarianism because
communitarian arguments for the defensibility of the
physical and ideological boundaries of communities are being
adapted by those calling for tighter citizenship
requirements, and more stringent enforcement.106
Since liberal individualist citizenship is a
contractual arrangement defined by the legal definition of
rights, we may deduce that a nation"s laws reflect its view
of citizenship.107 For those already possessing
1°6 TJle use
justifications of the concept of difference, as
found
in
some
communitarian
writings,
by
proponents
of
hypernationalism and anti-immigration movements are one aspect of
the
current
debate
between
liberal
individualists
and
communitarians on the topic of citizenship. Examples include
Franklin Hugh Adler, '"Racism, Difference and the Right in France,"
Paper delivered at the 1994 meeting of the American Political
Science Association; Jasjeet S. Sekhon, "Nationalism, Racism, and
Communitarianism," Paper delivered a the 1994 meeting of the
American Political Science Association; Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism;
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism; Michael Ignatieff, Blood and
Belonging.

107 As an outstanding recent example of scholarship along these
lines, Rogers Brubaker has developed a model for understanding the
sources of the citizenship laws of liberal democracies by analyzing
nations' self-understandings. This study is historically welldocumented and undermines the liberal claim of a grounding in
principles which are universally applicable. The implications of
Brubaker's model indicate that even among industrialized liberal
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citizenship, liberal individualist conceptions build on a
contractarian Lockean model.108 This yields a pragmatic
deontology, based on the human need for physical security
and the capacity of a state to provide it. The Lockean
groundwork is supplemented by Kantian and Rawlsian moral
deontology, which emphasizes the self as a moral agent, and
the state as morally-defensible because of its ability to
enforce law and implement justice. For Rawls, the state is
obligated to provide the context for the operationalization
of the principles of justice.109 However, the content of
the two principles necessitates redistribution based on
judgments regarding equality of opportunity, which in turn

democracies,
substantial differences exist in nations1 self
perception, and therefore in citizenship laws. Please see Rogers
Brubaker, Citizenship in France and Germany; also Rogers Brubaker,
"International Migration: A Challenge for Humanity," International
Migration Review 25 (Winter 1991): 946-57.
108 The most important rights institutionalized by the contract
are the right to self-preservation, and the right to preservation
of one's property. It is the "fundamental, sacred, and unalterable
law of self-preservation for which men entered into society." John
Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: MacMillan, 1947), 197.
"The great and chief end of men's uniting into commonwealths and
putting themselves under government is the preservation of their
property." Ibid., 184.
109 As we know, the principles of justice are supported by a
"thin account of the good." "...[T]he circumstances of justice
obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put
forward
conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under
conditions of moderate scarcity." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 128; also, "The
principles of justice have a definite content and the argument
supporting them uses only the thin account of the good and its list
of primary goods." Ibid., 564.
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requires an elaborate state.110
Nozick does not use the language of justice and the
well-ordered society, but justifies the minimalist state on
grounds that, given the diversity and natural rights of
persons, it is the fairest arrangement. In this state, not
only the state itself, but the responsibilities of
citizenship, are minimal. Citizens must be vigilant in
preventing the state from evolving into more than what is
indicated by a parsimonious list of appropriate functions.
The citizen of Nozick*s model possesses the latitude to make
a broad array of personal decisions, and therefore, to
restrict the state to the "narrow functions of
protection. ... *'111 The dignity of the citizen is only
ensured under these circumstances.112
110 Friedrich Hayek contends that application of Rawls'
principles of
justice will result,
inter alia. in problems
enforcing citizenship laws: "Rather than admit people to the
advantages that living in their country offers, a nation will
prefer to keep
them out altogether; for, once admitted, they will
soon claim as
a right a particular , share of its wealth.
The
conception that citizenship or even residence in a country confers
a claim to a particular standard of living is becoming a source of
international friction." Friedrich Hayek "Equality, Value and
Merit," in Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 96.
111 Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York: Basic
Books, 1974), ix.
112 "The minimal state treats us an inviolate individuals, who
may not be use in certain ways by others as means, or tools, or
instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual
rights with the dignity this constitutes." Ibid., 333-34. Also,
"[A]s soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially
the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it....But
there is no room for entertaining any such questions when a
person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides
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For our purposes, the crucial point here is that for
both Rawls and Nozick, the antecedence of the individuated
self predicates the model of the citizen, the structure of
the state, and the rules and benefits of citizenship. The
liberal individualist version of democracy suggests that at
each of these strata, all the elements necessary for the
operation of the second part of the hermeneutic circle are
present. Under these constraints, citizenship is an
agreement entered into where state and citizen both have
obligations. In this regard, Rawls concentrates on the
obligations of the state to provide conditions favorable to
implementation of the two principles of justice, and thereby
provide equality of opportunity and just distribution of
social goods under the condition of scarcity.113 Nozick
focuses on the importance of individuals who, as citizens,
are vigilant in deterring the state from becoming unwieldy
and intrusive. The state supervises services which afford
basic protection and allows each citizen to pursue their

himself...." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1974),
141-42.
113 The two principles of justice are, "First: each person is
to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all." John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 60.

93
unique vision of utopia.114 Nozick1s utopia is the
epistemological equivalent of Rawls' well-ordered society,
since both are idealized constructions of the optimal
context in which humans live together.
All of this highlights differences in the liberal
individualist and communitarian views of citizenship. The
liberal individualist construction of the self and the
citizen precludes the possibility that the individual could
be constitutively impacted by a community in the
communitarian sense. For communitarians, the community is
the entity which shapes formation of the interests,
preferences, and identities of its members. For
communitarians, common membership in a community means that
shared understandings facilitate the making of collective
decisions.
In Nozick's model it is possible that an individual be
born into a libertarian community where the highest value is
placed on the ability of each person to chose the
appropriate community for him/herself. In this case, the
individual may chose to move to a community where citizens
acknowledge and nurture mutually-constitutive bonds. But if
the individual is already fully constituted, how could
114 For Nozick, there are as many utopias as there are
individuals, "Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where
people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and
attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal
community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision on
others." Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic
Books, 1974), 312.
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he/she become a part of a community designed to have such an
high degree of impact on his/her identity? In short, when
Rawls' individual emerges from behind the veil, and Nozick's
leaves the state of nature, he/she is already constituted to
an extent that makes the kind of ties which communitarians
postulate as the bonds between citizens impossible.
The autonomy and individuation of the self, along with
the prospect of incommensurable moral claims associated with
collective choices, indicate that the state must remain
unbiased in its treatment of individuals, and evaluation of
policy.115 Implementation of the principle of neutrality
means that a state must gives equal treatment to all
citizens, and consider impartially the applications of
outsiders wishing to gain entrance and citizenship. In
115 Nancy Rosenblum describes the liberal axiom of neutrality
as the "deliberate distancing of government, and of justifications
for government action, from official recognition of a view of the
good life...." Nancy Rosenblum, Introduction in Liberalism and the
Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 6. According to Ronald Dworkin, since liberalism is
committed to equality, "political decisions must be, so far as it
is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good
life,
or
of what
gives value to
life."
Ronald
Dworkin,
"Liberalism," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 127. In an
effort to reduce contention over incommensurable claims, liberal
individualists sometimes recommend removing contentious issues from
the political agenda, (to the extent that this may be possible).
"The hope of liberal political theory, and the basis of the most
common solutions to the problem of moral conflict in a pluralist
society, is that citizens can still agree on principles that would
remove decisions about the policy from the political agenda.
Liberals
typically
invoke higher-order principles,
such as
neutrality and impartiality, that are intended to transcend the
disagreement on specific policies...." Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, "Moral Conflict and Political Consensus," Ethics 101
(October 1990): 64.
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addition the state must treat all persons within its borders
equally.
Categories of rights for differing groups requires
accepting governmental differentiation between groups of
individuals, and of the state as a community with boundaries
which are valid and therefore defensible. In the current
debate on citizenship boundaries are variously considered in
physical and/or ideological terms.116 The freedom of
individuals as moral agents, and the hesitancy of the state
to impose differing views of the good life emphasize
diversity.117 But the tenets of liberal individualism offer
116 For example, ^please see Rainier Baubock,
"Changing
Boundaries
of Citizenship:
The Inclusion of Immigrants
in
Democratic Politics," Paper presented at the 1994 meeting of the
American Political Science Association? Eric Gorham,
"Social
Citizenship and Its Fetters," Paper presented at the 1994 meeting
of the American Political Science Association? Julie Mostov,
"Endangered Citizenship," Paper presented at the 1994 meeting of
the American
Political
Science Association?
J.M.
Barbalet,
Citizenship. Using the premises of liberal individualism, Baubock
argues for the inclusion of all persons within the borders of a
state to some level of citizenship rights on the basis of their
physical presence. Gorham argues for increased specificity in the
conceptualization of citizenship by dividing it into four component
parts? (one of these categories is moral capacity/civic virtue).
Mostov also takes an ideological approach and argues for a
strengthening of the liberal concept of citizenship as a means of
promoting democratic activity in the form of participation which
will keep a check on government. Barbalet is a re-examination of
T.H. Marshall's seminal work, Class. Citizenship and Social
Development. Barbalet updates observations on the correlation
between citizenship on one hand, and socio-economic status (i.e.
class), on the other.
117 Stephen Macedo outlines the interconnectedness of the
liberal tenets of autonomy and neutrality, and their implications
for the policies
of liberal
states
regarding citizenship:
"Autonomy, as a liberal ideal... supports the energetic, selfcritical, and independent virtues of liberal citizenship, and would
seem to be a prerequisite of flourishing in a diverse, tolerant
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little direction for the mediation between communal
subgroups within the state, or between citizens and
outsiders.
For liberal individualists the primary questions which
define citizenship are how to fairly adjudicate between
citizens, how to protect citizens from the violation of
their rights by others or by the state, and how to decide
the bases for access to citizenship. As a consequence,
normative theory and practical policy recommendations are
concerned with the protection of rights, and the formulation
of rules. Justification for protecting rights is derived
either from state of nature theory,

(as exemplified by Locke

and Kant), or by application of the greatest happiness
principle, designed to maximize the happiness of the
greatest number of citizens. The latter is of course
grounded in the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, and
endorses an analog to individual rights: protection of
individual liberty since it is the means of implementing the
greatest happiness for the greatest number.

liberal society. Liberalism is generally anti-paternalistic: it
seeks to respect persons with basic reflective capacities and
resists the political promotion of thickly textured common
conceptions of the good life." Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 252-53.
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Democracy as Essential in the Liberal Individualist:
Conception of a Well-Ordered Society
The premises of the individual1s autonomy and right to
self-determination, and the value of neutrality on the part
of the polity, mean that liberal individualists must account
for why democracy, as a regime type, is the optimal choice.
Simply put, why would a state grounded in the tenets of
liberal individualism choose democratic political
institutions over some alternative? Given the priorities of
liberal individualism, democracy is not only an option, but
essential to the structuring and maintenance of a wellordered society. What we consider modern democracy is the
favored institutional arrangement of liberalism, but liberal
individualism has left a distinctive mark on Western notions
of democracy. Hence the term "liberal democracy."
The highly individuated self of liberal individualism
is a person with his/her own distinctive notion of the good
life. Ronald Dworkin emphasizes that a government must treat
all citizens as eguals, because each individual's notion of
the good life is equally valid.118 The diversity of liberal
selves means that "citizens have different theories of the
good and hence different preferences."119 Individuation

118 "I want to argue that a certain conception of equality,
which I shall call the liberal conception of equality, is the nerve
of liberalism." Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Public and Private
Morality. ed.
Stuart
Hampshire
(Cambridge,
Eng:
Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 115.
119 Ibid. , 130.
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indicates autonomy of choice, and this autonomy means
"disagreement" will inevitably occur. Dworkin thus concludes
that "the liberal needs mechanisms to satisfy the principles
of equal treatment in spite of these differences."120 These
considerations frame Dworkin*s explanation as to why
democracy is the logical choice for liberals,
The liberal will decide that there are no better
mechanisms available, as general political
institutions, than the two main institutions of
our own political economy: the economic
market...and representative democracy.121
Representative democracy is useful to liberalism because it
provides the mechanisms to mediate conflicts resulting from
the plethora of ideas pertaining to the good life.
Judith Shklar similarly asserts that liberals must
defend their choice of an appropriate political system. For
Shklar, "liberalism has one overriding aim: to secure the
political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of
personal freedom."122 The chief requisite for a state
committed to liberal goals is that it create the context for
120 Ibid., 130.
121 Ibid., 130.
122 Judith N. Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism
and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989) , 21. T.M. Scanlon also emphasizes the
importance of individual liberty and autonomy, "To be concerned
with individual autonomy is to be concerned with the rights,
liberties and other conditions necessary for individuals to develop
their own aims and interests and to make their preferences
effective in shaping their own lives and contributing to the
formation of social policy." T.M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and
Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 97-98.
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the exercise of individual autonomy. But the most likely
threat to personal freedom is posed by the power of the
state. The paramount goal therefore becomes a state whose
laws grant the conditions for freedom, while at the same
time vesting in citizens the authority necessary to keep the
state in check.123
Guided by these concerns, Shklar sees democracy as the
only sensible choice. In a democracy, the rule of law which
provides for diffusion of power, and free elections, with
the resultant accountability of leaders to the electorate,
are the mechanisms of restraint. According to Shklar,
liberalism has not only adopted, but has defined
contemporary democracy. Democracy is essential to the
liberal individualist conception of a well-ordered society
not because of any intrinsic affinity between liberal and
democratic tenets, but on pragmatic grounds,
The institutions of a pluralist order with
multiple centers of power and institutionalized
rights is merely a description of a liberal
123 m p h e
original first principle of liberalism, the rule of
law....is the prime instrument to restrain governments." Judith N.
Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism and the Moral Life,
ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
37. Shklar's apprehensions regarding governmental power are based
on the potential of the state to intrude into the private sphere,
and on the possibility that the state may itself become an agent of
cruelty and terror.
Of course,
apprehension regarding the
possibility for the state to misuse its power is widely articulated
in liberal individualist writings. John Locke warned that "tyranny
is the exercise of power beyond right," and would be reflected in
"actions not directed to the preservation of properties of the
people, but the satisfaction o f ... ambition, revenge, covetousness,
or any other irregular passion." John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government (London: MacMillan, 1947), 222-23.
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political society. It is also of necessity a
democratic one, because without enough equality
and power to protect and assert one's rights,
freedom is but a hope....It is therefore fair to
say that liberalism is monogamously, faithfully,
and permanently married to democracy— but it is a
marriage of convenience.124
John Rawls arrives at his choice of democracy as the
preferred political system because of its ability to
transpose the two principles of justice into practicable
form.125 There is, in fact, a common theme evident in
Shklar, Dworkin and Rawls which offers insight into the
liberal individualist attitude toward democracy: democratic
institutions are chosen for instrumental reasons. Democracy
is a means to an end. When adapted to the priorities of
liberal individualism, democracy has the capacity to protect
individual freedom, to provide for restraint of the state by
citizens, to set as a goal the equal treatment of all
citizens, and to make the principle of maximum equal
individual liberty and the difference principle workable in
terms of policy.126
124 Judith N. Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism
and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 37.
125 ". . . [0]nce we try to find a rendering of them [the two
principles] which treats everyone equally as a moral person, and
which does not weight men's share in the benefits and burdens of
social cooperation according to their social fortune or luck in the
natural lottery, it is clear that the democratic interpretation is
the best choice among the alternatives." John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 75.
126 In Rawls' writings subsequent to A Theory of Justice,
justification for the principles of justice is grounded less in
neo-Kantian metaphysics, and more in the contention that the
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The commitment to protection of the division between
the public and private lives of citizens leads to the
question of whether the aims of liberal individualism and
democracy are fully compatible. Securing "the conditions
necessary for the exercise of personal freedom"127 is
accomplished by placing individuals' right to privacy (from
state intrusion into their personal lives) as preeminent
among the rights of citizens.128 If each citizen has
his/her view of the good life, and the good life is lived in
the private realm, this is the logical deduction.129 One
issue raised by the need for protection from state intrusion
principles are endemic to the democratic political tradition,
"[S]ince justice as fairness is intended as a political conception
for a democratic society, it tries to draw solely upon basic
intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political institutions of
a constitutional democratic regime....Justice as fairness is a
political conception in part because it starts from within a
certain political tradition." John Rawls, "Justice As Fairness:
Political Not Metaphysical," in Communitarianism and Individualism,
ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University
Press, 18 9.
127 Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism and
the Moral
Life. ed.
Nancy Rosenblum
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 21.
128 "Liberalism prohibits collective choices from interfering
with personal freedom. Democracy promises that they reflect popular
will. Two competing ends cannot simultaneously be maximized.
Democracy and liberalism part company when collective choices
threaten to interfere with personal freedom, or personal freedom
threatens to interfere with collective choice." Amy Gutmann, "The
Disharmony of Democracy," in Democratic Community, ed. John Chapman
and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 13435.
129 Nancy Rosenblum points out that "every version of liberal
theory draws a boundary between public and private life." Nancy L.
Rosenblum, Introduction, in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed.
Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7.
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is that of accountability. Among the reasons that democracy
is the favored choice of liberal individualists is,
democratic forms incorporate channels by which citizens may
hold the state accountable.130 If elected officials, as
agents of the state, are answerable to the electorate,
citizens will be able to protect themselves from an
overreaching state.131
This being the case, it is often difficult for liberal
individualists to explain what could motivate a citizen's
commitment to the state, to a specific community, or to
other citizens at large. The liberal individualist model of
the self leaves little room for an altruism which could
explicate the source of allegiance to a community and a
state, and a commitment to the collective good,

(when the

collective good is separate or different from the good of an
130 Direct or popular democracy is generally considered
unrealistic given the overriding private interests of citizens, and
the size and complexity of the modern nation-state. This being the
case,
liberal
individualists
have
offered
a
variety
of
recommendations
on
ways
to
maximize
meaningful
political
participation on the part of citizens. Among these: James Fishkin,
Democracy and Deliberation; Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist
Democracy; Amy Gutmann,
"The Disharmony of Democracy,"
in
Democratic Community.
131 Deliberative democracy is one response on the part of
liberal individualists to these concerns. Inter alia, deliberative
democracy pictures the citizen as an autonomous deliberator, who
takes the acquisition of information and implications of his/her
political judgments seriously. "The aim of deliberative democracy
is not popular rule, but autonomy.... The test of a democratic
political institution is not direct participation by all but
effective accountability of those who make decisions to those who
do not." Amy Gutmann, "The Disharmony of Democracy," in Democratic
Community, ed. John Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York
University Press, 1993), 144.
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individual).132 If the identity of the citizen is
constituted pre-socially, are there bonds between citizens
which could motivate such commitment? What happens when
private interests conflict with the general good? Under the
premises of liberal individualism we must expect citizens to
prioritize private interests over the public good. To the
extent that filial sentiments and some level of civic
mindedness among citizens are needed for democratic
132 The absence of factors which can motivate or explain civic
mindedness in the liberal individualist conception of citizenship
is clearly a matter of concern. I will mention three views which
represent a spectrum of opinions. Robert Nozick does not expect
individuals to set aside private and personal interests to involve
themselves in a public or political realm. One assumption of the
minimal state is that individual and state interests do not
coincide. Citizens enter the social contract only provisionally,
and must maintain the right to evaluate and endorse or reject
virtually all state activities. Please see Robert Nozick, Anarchy.
State, and Utopia. Robert Dahl acknowledges the tension between the
liberal individualistic pursuit and protection of personal liberty
on one hand, and the potential benefits to a democratic system of
citizen involvement and allegiance, on the other. Dahl suggests two
ways of resolving this conflict. One is by sketching a picture of
the public mindedness of civic republicanism, ostensibly to be
fostered through public education. The other is to contend that,
based on invisible hand theories, public and private interests are
not really at odds. Consequently citizens' pursuit of their private
interests will have no detrimental effect on the public good.
Please see Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Amy
Gutmann also recognizes potential strife between private freedom,
and the need for dedication to the collective good in a democracy.
Gutmann argues that "the real dilemma of modern liberalism...is not
that people are naturally egoistical, but that they disagree about
the nature of the good life." Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics
of Liberalism," in Communitarianism and Individualism. 130. But
Gutmann also entertains an idealistic vision of the nature and
capacities of the self— one which encompasses the possibility that
citizens are willing to learn the skills and interests necessary to
pursue the good of the whole. Please see Amy Gutmann, "Undemocratic
Education," in Liberalism and the Moral Life? "The Disharmony of
Democracy," in Democratic Community; also Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, "Moral Conflict and Political Consensus," Ethics 101
(October 1990): 64-88.
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functioning, the liberal individualist model of the self and
the citizen are at odds with the requisites of democracy.
One method of resolving this discord is to apply the
assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, where market
forces mediate the distribution of goods as citizens pursue
individual preferences. Drawing on Adam Smith's depiction of
the working of the invisible hand can eradicate the
potential conflict between private and public interests.
From this perspective, liberal democracy is the unfettered
pursuit of self-interest by all citizens. Yet the activities
this entails conduce toward the good of the whole.
Maximization of the public good is an unintended consequence
of individual citizens pursuing private self-interests.133
Communitarianism does not incorporate a clear
distinction between the social and political realms, both
are the domain of the good life and both are public. By
contrast, liberal individualism places a stark distinction
between the public and private spheres. Conceptions of the
good life are formed and pursued in private, while the
political is associated with the public. The liberal
individualist citizen is geared toward private pursuit of
the good life, but expects to live in a well-ordered
society. This society is well-ordered not because of what
133 "...[T]he case for rights (or moral rules) is seen to rest
on their role in promoting maximum utility through the coordination
of
individual
action." Ronald Dworkin,
"Rights,
Goals
and
Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 106.
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he/she may contribute to it, but the through the appropriate
structuration of institutions, and the order maintained by
good laws.
In analyzing communitarian thought we noted implicit
assumptions of democracy. In surveying liberal individualist
thought we find explicit endorsements of democracy, but of a
democracy constructed around the premises and aims of
liberal individualism. The constraints indicated by the
tenets of liberal individualism permit adaptation of
democracy in a manner which suits liberal objectives.
Because this version of democracy is grounded in the
antecedence of the individual, only a coincidental
convergence of interests can explain instances of consensus
among citizens. For these reasons, democracy, as conceived
by liberal individualists, is limited to the functions
associated with the second portion of the hermeneutic
circle.
Democracy is essential to liberal individualism because
the emphasis on personal liberty necessitates a political
system that can be restrained by citizens, which will
protect individual rights, and will maintain neutrality by
avoiding judgments on differing notions of the good life.
Moreover, since democracy places value on citizen input in
political decisions, it offers a way of balancing the
tendencies for the alienation and fragmentation which result
from the need to mould the individuated self into a citizen.
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Liberal individualism is an important, if not the
predominant, strand of liberalism. Moreover the
individualistic aspects of liberal individualism are the
source of discord between it and communitarianism.
The Liberal Individualist Citizen and the Well-Ordered
Society
For the liberal individualist citizen, citizenship in a
liberal democracy is the means of concluding the social
contract and formalizing the relationship between the
individual and the state. Possessing or attaining
citizenship accomplishes several purposes. First,
citizenship enables the individual to avail him/herself of
the physical security afforded by membership in a nation
state. Second, citizenship in a liberal democracy gives the
individual the legal means by which to thwart the state from
passing judgment on his/her conception of the good life, and
the means to prevent the state from intruding into his/her
private life. Third, citizenship in a liberal democracy
entitles the individual to just treatment by the state with
all other citizens. This may involve equal rights in a
minimal state such as the one outlined by Nozick, equal
treatment as advocated by Ronald Dworkin, or fair treatment
as indicated by the difference principle in a Rawlsian
welfare state. Finally, citizenship in a liberal democracy
provides the individual with the means of mediating disputes
with other citizens.
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In communitarianism, democratic processes are evident
when communitarians describe a community making collective
choices. There are, as we have noted, areas where the values
of communitarianism and the aims of democracy are not
consonant.134 This observation also applies to liberal
individualism. Democracy is essential to the functioning of
a well-ordered society, but the melding of liberal values
and democratic processes is problematic. Examining the
liberal individualist requisites for forms of governance
gives insight into how democracy has become essential to
liberal individualism, and what variety of democracy
"liberal democracy" is. The priorities of liberal
individualism for governance are grounded in respect for the
rights of individuals and the need for safeguards against
tyranny.
Reconciling these aims with democratic processes puts
liberal individualists in the position of arguing that the
autonomous and individuated self is not only egoistic, but

134 Potential areas of friction between communitarian ideas and
democratic functioning include: a model of the self with intrinsic
constraints on the extent of autonomous individual deliberation.
Second,
the particularist and contextualist perspective of
communitarianism provides little guidance on the question of how to
deal with those outside the community,
(whether community is
conceived as a subgroup of a state, or the state itself). Third,
the possibility of reliance on a natural aristocracy comprised of
those with an understanding of virtue and reason, creates the
potential for an undemocratic hierarchy of leadership. Fourth, if
foundational shared understandings are turned outward to focus on
the differences between community members and outsiders, the result
can be exclusionary chauvinism, and at worst, hypernationalism and
hate-mongering.
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altruistic as well. The need for some cohesion among the
citizenry that can serve as the framework for democratic
decision-making, necessitates explication of how to build
some basic solidarity. Normative theory in this area focuses
on the ability of individuals to learn the skills associated
with democratic citizenship. Such perspectives stress on the
benefits of education designed to foster an understanding of
political institutions, respect for the rule of law, the
value of acquiring political information, and voluntary
political participation beyond the act of voting.135
An alternative response to the tension between
individual autonomy and democratic participation is to
acknowledge that citizens are self-interested, and should
therefore not be expected to exhibit a desire to engage in
public activities. This perspective leads to liberal
individualist conceptions of democracy which are
minimalistic, where the egoism of the autonomous self is the
chief determinant of politics. The citizen is a utility
maximizer who pursues his/her vision of the good life
privately. The state is a mechanism necessary to provide
some level of physical security and guarantees of basic
political and civil rights. Accordingly, the goal of
equality among citizens is set aside because its
135 For selected examples of this, please see: Amy Gutmann,
"Undemocratic Education,11 in Liberalism and the Moral Life; William
Galston, "Civic Education in the Liberal State," in Liberalism and
the Moral Life; Richard Arneson, "Liberal Democratic Community," in
Liberal Community; James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation.
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implementation would require excessive state apparatus.
Democracy is reduced to the requisite of competitive
elections with the unfettered functioning of the laws of
supply and demand governing distribution.136
The centrality of the individual in liberalism is
evident in the three historical exemplars as well as
contemporary sources. The individual portrayed by Locke has
fundamental instincts to preserve him/herself and his/her
property. The contract links the self to the state as a
citizen and the state is entrusted with protecting the
inalienable rights of the citizens. In Kant we see the
dignity of the individual grounded in the capacity for
choice, and the ability to evaluate prospective actions on
the basis of whether they are universalizable. Kant also
reflects a liberal individualistic concern with the
potential for enmity, and the dire need for established law.
On Liberty particularly reflects John Stuart Mill's
emphasis on the importance of freedom for each citizen to
express his unique opinion on matters of public importance.
However, in the same text, Mill asserts: "No one pretends
that actions should be as free as opinions."137 The liberal
individualist model of the self indicates not only political

136 Examples here include: Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Democracy; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy;
Robert Nozick, Anarchy.
State. and Utopia; Friedrich Hayek,
"Equality, Value and Merit," in Liberalism and Its Critics.
137 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. 119.
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guarantees for personal liberty, but the requirement of
political authority capable of maintaining civil order.
These two concerns, which are not entirely harmonious either
with each other or with the values of democracy, are at the
core of liberal individualistic thought regarding
citizenship. The individual is the central reference point
for conceptions of citizenship and the design of political
institutions. The importance of the individual as a moral
agent is evidenced in the conceptualization of the self with
rights which are inalienable because they are presocial. On
these grounds citizenship is a legally ascribed status. As
an epistemological foundation, liberal individualists
present universalistic first-order principles as those
tenets upon which reasonable people would agree.
In the liberal individualist model of democratic
citizenship, the diversity of viewpoints are generated by
each citizen arriving at his/her preferences and opinions
independently. The plurality of interests is anticipated on
the basis of the autonomy of individuals. Public discourse
is for the purpose of giving to citizens the opportunity to
relate these opinions. This degree of individuation means
that the liberal individualist citizen is predisposed toward
critical appraisal using self-interest as the referent. In
short, acknowledgement and expectation of diversity in the
citizen body correspond to a particular perspective on
democracy, where democracy is associated with what I have
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described as the second half of the hermeneutic circle.

Chapter III:
The Self and Citizen of Hermeneutic Democracy as a Mean

Hermeneutic Democracy as a Medium of Communication Between
Communitarianism and Liberal Individualism
What can a hermeneutic theory of democracy contribute
to debate on the topic of citizenship between liberal
individualists and communitarians? Each of these approaches
incorporate important facets of democracy in order to
document the benefits of the polities which their
perspectives would create. For this reason, a hermeneutic
theory of democratic citizenship facilitates communication
between the two schools of thought, as well as elucidating
their strengths and imbalances. As a theoretical reference
point, Aristotle advances a hermeneutic model of democracy.
An Aristotelian perspective rebuts the antecedence of
either the individual or the community which is fundamental
and determinative for communitarians and liberal
individualists. A conception of citizenship which draws on
the resources of hermeneutic democracy, provides a context
for communication between liberal individualists and
communitarians because it integrates the sociallyconstituted and individualistic aspects of the self in a
manner which indicates that these two facets need not be
mutually exclusive. Similarly, in the hermeneutic model, we
112
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find symmetry between the individual and collective aspects
of citizens' involvement in the polity.
As outlined in the Introduction, a hermeneutic model
conceives of democracy in terms of a two part circle of
dialectical processes. As the essential ingredient, public
dialogue is the context for exchange of opinions and making
decisions on issues at hand. In the first part of the
hermeneutic circle, such discourse is grounded in the
interests which citizens share as co-members of a political
community. Fundamental areas of common concern and consensus
are the framework for public dialogue. This portion of
hermeneutic processes reinforces fundamental areas of
concord in the democratic polity by nurturing remembrance
and perpetuation of norms. In the first half of the
hermeneutic circle we see the activities of the sociallyconstituted aspects of the self, and the evidence of the
impact of community on the identity of the individual.
The second portion of the circle of hermeneutic
democracy is utilization of perspective gained in the
discussion of proximate issues to examine foundational
agreements and their premises. Collective critical selfanalysis is grounded in the commitment of each citizen to
evaluate trends in community thinking and the caliber of
decisions which the polity is making. This part of the
hermeneutic cycle sustains the vitality of democratic
processes by averting the potentially detrimental influence
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of unexamined assumptions and outmoded precedents. While we
anticipate that some voices will have more influence than
others, the dynamics of critical self-appraisal ensure that
deprivileged viewpoints and marginalized interests will
continue to find their expression. In the activities
associated with the second half of the hermeneutic circle we
see the impact of individual citizens on the community, and
the individuated, autonomous self in action.
In short, I am presenting a hermeneutic model of
democratic citizenship as founded in Aristotelian thought,
and endorsing its usefulness as a means of analyzing the
citizenship debate between liberal individualists and
communitarians. The central axiom of Aristotle's
hermeneutics is the merit of balance and moderation as
exemplified by the mean. Specifically, the principle of the
mean generates symmetry on two axes. First, between the
theoretical and the practical. Second, between the politics
of the self and the politics of the community. As a result,
using this model, we are able to give balanced consideration
to the concerns of both the individual and the community and
to maintain conceptual linkage between theory and practice
in a manner precluded in communitarian and liberal
individualist models.
In communitarianism, the concept of community is
reified to the point that it is difficult to grasp, or even
deduce, a concise notion of what "community" is meant to
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convey. In liberal individualism, this applies to the
abstracted model of the individual. The self which is
initially conceived in a presocial context is an idealized
hypothetical construct which precludes a coherent
transposition of the individual into society, or
establishment of a logical point at which to move from the
realm of theory to practice. Using the principle of the mean
affords an equilibrium between consideration of theory and
practice and the individual and the community, making it
possible to observe and discuss theory and practice, and/or
the individual and the community without conflating them, or
giving one half of either pair priority over the other. The
contrast between this stance, and the effects of antecedence
for liberal individualism and communitarianism,

is clear.

The premises of liberal individualism constantly pull in the
direction of the importance and options of the individual.
Similarly, the assumptions of communitarianism push this
perspective toward an emphasis on the privileges and
prerogatives of the community.
In a hermeneutic model of democratic citizenship, the
individual is constituted not only by membership in
communities, but the community is constituted by its members
through members' interpretation and understanding of it.
Hence, the relationship between the individual and the
community is dynamic and transformational, as opposed to
static and positional. The individual and the community are
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reciprocally constituted, mutually reinforcing, and the
relationship between them remains in a state of flux because
they are continuously influencing, redefining, and thereby
recasting each other. From the hermeneutic perspective,
democracy is conceived of as both a means and the end— the
method and the ideal. In this way, the hermeneutic model of
democracy establishes a linkage between theory and practice,
since means and method apply to practical realm, end and
ideal to the theoretical.
In a hermeneutic view of democratic citizenship,
citizens are constitutive of the polity. And the converse
also obtains: the polity is constitutive of the citizens
because its laws shape behavior, and because of the many
ways in which the design of its institutions impact the
proliferation and tenor of associational relationships. In
addition, the language of democracy has constitutive
influence. The modes and norms of communication affect the
manner in which interests are expressed, the formation of
interests, and the likelihood of conflict resolution.
The impact of language as constitutive of community
life and political norms is frequently overlooked. Of
crucial significance to the interactive communication
associated with democracy are the fundamental premises that
no subjects are taboo, and that citizen involvement is
encouraged. In other words, the first norm of democratic
language is that neither perspectives nor solutions are
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rejected out of hand. This grounding is compatible with the
principles of democracy, and with hermeneutic epistemology.
The consequence is epistemological pluralism, meaning that
the fairness of democratic discourse and the legitimacy of
th^ decisions it yields are derived directly from its
inclusiveness. In short, seeing democracy in terms of
hermeneutic processes affects an enhanced, comprehensive
understanding of the purposes and consequences of dialogue.
This is a primary reason for the usefulness of the
hermeneutic model of democratic discourse in functioning as
a medium of communication between liberal individualists and
communitarians.
Aristotle affirms that democratic processes are
enhanced by seeking the broadening of perspectives which
results from the political participation of a diverse
assortment of citizens. The value of moderation is affirmed,
but so is a mindset of openness to the development of
innovative options. Moreover, these qualities are desirable
not only in the self, but also in the arrangement of the
polity,
...virtue is a mean...and the best life must be
the middle life, consisting in a mean which is
open to men of every kind to attain. And the same
principle must be applicable to the virtue or
badness of constitutions and states. For the

138 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1295a34;
the word rendered "constitution" here is politeia. It is worth
noting the inadequacy of constitution, or any other single English
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Considered in this light, "constitution" connotes both what
coheres, that is, the politeia. and what facilitates the
coherence, that is, the citizens.139 A significant point in
distinguishing the hermeneutic democratic model of
citizenship from the liberal individualist and communitarian
models is that virtue is a mean, not an ideal understood in

word, as a translation. Politeia conveys an expansive conception of
the city encompassing social, political, and economic networks and
norms— virtually all modes of associative relationships including
those between the citizens and the polis. "It is a fairly logical
development that politeia should come to denote the civil community
and public life. What is harder to explain is why it assumed the
sense of "constitution"; indeed, at first— and not infrequently
later— it is used in such a way that it can also be translated
"citizenry." Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 171. This is not a
case of linguistic sloppiness, or underdevelopment. Attic Greek has
at least eight words which must all be translated into English as
"knowledge." The point I would like to emphasize here is the
conceptual integration of the interests of the citizens with those
of the polity. Aristotle conveys this in the overt message of this
passage; it is also strongly suggested when we consider the
connotations of the language.
139 This reflects a balancing of stances at several levels
because the mean is not merely an external rule-of-thumb. The mean
is the epistemological fulcrum as well as the guide for practical
application.
According
to
Aristotle,
individual
citizens
internalize the mean and use it as the foundational methodology for
self-development and the making of choices. Moreover, the mean can
be used by citizens as a guide for collective reasoning and
decision-making. The mean is introduced in the Nicomachean Ethics
as a method for the making of individual choices: "...[A]ny
discussion on matters of action cannot be more than an outline and
is bound to lack precision; for...there are no fixed data in
matters
concerning
action
and questions
of
what
is
beneficial....And if this is true of our general discussion, our
treatment of particular problems will
be
even lessprecise, since
these do not come under the head of any art
which can be
transmitted by precept, but the agent must consider on each
different occasion what the situation demands...." Aristotle,
Nichomachean Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1962), 1104a.
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absolute terms, but a rather a proximate point of
balance.140
The context of seeking the mean is indicative of the
epistemological nature of political knowledge in the
hermeneutic model: the mean is not used with an absolute and
moralistic conception of virtue as the referent. So in
reference to what is the mean moderate? The mean is the
point of moderation "relative to us."141 Humans in the
collective sense of the political community are the

140 "We are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what
virtue is, but in order to become good, else there would be no
advantage in studying it." Ibid., 1103b. This reflects Aristotle's
interest in immanent guidelines for personal development and
positive self-transformation. The mean is an immanent guideline,
not an elusive target or an absolute, transcendent ideal, (as, for
example, "virtue" becomes in the schema of Alisdair MacIntyre).
Using the principle of the mean indicates locating the path of
moderation and equilibrium, whenever possible, from among available
and feasible options. Aristotle acknowledges that finding a mean is
not possible in every instance. What he emphasizes is the benefit
of an mindset which avoids extremes: "Not every action nor every
emotion admits of a mean." Ibid., 1107a; "The first concern of a
man who aims at
the medium should, therefore, be to avoid the
extreme...." Ibid., 1109a.
141 "We may
thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a
characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing
the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational
principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use...." Ibid.,
1106b. The mean is flexible, not guided universalistic premises. To
explicate this Aristotle compares how the mean operates in contrast
to strict adherence to written laws: "...[A]11 law is universal,
but there are some things about which is it is not possible to
speak correctly in universal terms....And this is the very nature
of the equitable, a rectification of law where law falls short be
reason of its universality... For where a thing is indefinite, the
rule by which it
is measured is also indefinite...so a decree is
adapted to a given situation." Ibid., 1137b.
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reference point.142 What is right and true, is so with
regard to the citizens because we are the ones on whom the
implementation of decisions have bearing. This also reflects
the hermeneutic perspective on the nature of democracy
because the interests of citizens are the sole reference
point of justification and legitimacy. As a result,
determinations are made and political authority is justified
without appealing to rationality, absolute truths, or selfevident "facts." The Aristotelian model of hermeneutic
democracy is person-centered as well as community-centered.
Observations and suggestions are made in the context of the
feasible and accessible with regard to particular
individuals and an actual community, rather than,

(as with

communitarians and liberal individualists), by appeal to
reified notions of the community or the individual.

142 The perspective we find here on the capacity of humans to
gain political wisdom and the immanent nature of political
knowledge is reflective of a number of texts produced in fifth and
fourth century Athens. The Homeric tradition and its legacy in the
dramatic and philosophical works of democratic Athens are consonant
with what we find in Aristotle. One familiar example: "Numberless
are the world's wonders, but none more wonderful than man....Words
also, and thought as rapid as air, he fashions to his good use;
statecraft is his....O clear intelligence,
force beyond all
measure...." Sophocles, "Antigone," (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1977) , Scene I, Ode I. Also, "Man is the measure of all
things." Plato, "Theaetetus" 16 Ode, in The Oxford Dictionary of
Quotations, ed. Angela Partington (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 530.
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The Democratic Self as a Mean
Let us examine the sense in which the self of the
hermeneutic model is both socially-constituted and
autonomous. In Aristotle we find the socially-constituted
self and the autonomous individual integrated in the
democratic citizen—

probably the most pivotal observation

on the social disposition of the self is that "man is by
nature a political animal."143 The conception of
"political" here is quite broad. "Political" is a
transliteration indicating that having to do with the
polis.144 In Aristotle's perspective the sociallyconstituted and autonomous aspects of the self are not
contradictory, are rather features of a multi-faceted but
integrated self functioning in a democratic polity. The
Aristotelian perspective of the democratic citizen reflects
143 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1253al.
Several passages from Aristotle illustrate the sense in which the
self is depicted as socially-constituted. These can be, and have
been, cited in such a way as to establish an association between
Aristotle and communitarians. Upon closer inspection we will see
that this interpretation is skewed since it only tells half the
story.
144 Politikon zoon may be rendered as: "A being whose nature it
is to live in a polis." Please see Aristotle, The Politics (London:
Penguin, 1962), 1253al and 1253a7, and accompanying translation
note by Trevor J. Saunders. This picture of the human also appears
in the Nichomachean Ethics, and is, perhaps, clearer in that
version: "...[M]an who lives with parents, children, a wife, and
friends and fellow citizens, since man is by nature a social and
political being." Aristotle,
Nichomachaen Ethics
(New York:
MacMillan, 1962), 1097b; please see also, Ibid., 1297b. Martin
Otswald points out: "The term polis covers our concept 'society'
(for which the Greeks had no independent word), and politike is the
science of society as well as the science of the state." Martin
Otswald, translator and editor, Ibid., 313.
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characteristic moderation and symmetry: the identity of the
self is a balanced combination of socially-contingent and
autonomous factors. The democratic self of Aristotle can
serve as a mean in the debate between liberal individualists
and communitarians because Aristotle models an individual in
which the politics of the self incorporate both facets of
the hermeneutic circle.
Each of the facets of the self upholds and explains the
functioning of a corresponding half of the hermeneutic
circle. The socially-constituted aspects of the self
acknowledge the impact of the communal environment in
identity formation, and are cognizant of the commonality of
shared understandings. This self is the citizen when he/she
is inclined to participate in public discourse and
collective reasoning, as well as activities which build or
celebrate the bonds of common membership. The sociallyconstituted self corresponds to the first half of the
hermeneutic circle. The autonomous and individuated aspects
of the self appreciate the diversity among individuals that
is validated by the uniqueness of each, and the many ways in
which personal choices have impacted identity and individual
self-understanding. The individuated self as the citizen is
inclined to engage in individual reflection especially with
regard to the assessment of the premises and consensuses
which seem to be guiding the day-to-day decisions of the
polity. The autonomous facets of the self correspond to the
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self as a citizen taking a role in the second half of the
hermeneutic circle.
The model of hermeneutic processes articulated by
Aristotle reflects a distinctive view of the sources and
purposes of agreement in the citizen body, and one which
speaks to the concerns of both communitarians and liberal
individualists. Aristotle observes, " [H]umans...have
perception of good and evil, just and unjust. It is the
sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a
household and a state."145 Such assumptions can be linked
to liberal individualists as well as to communitarians.
Liberal individualists argue repeatedly that consensus on
fundamental issues is the foundation of socio-political
relations.146 What distinguishes the views of liberal
145 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1253a7.
146 For example, Gutmann, Dahl and Dworkin, appeal to the
existence of agreement on basic principles which can function as
the moral foundation and fundament consensus crucial to the
establishment of political institutions: "...the basis of the most
common solution to the problem of moral conflict in a pluralist
society, is that citizens can still agree on principle...higherorder principles that are intended to transcend disagreement on
specific policies...." Amy Gutmann, Ethics 101, (October 1990): 64.
"For even though a democratic country cannot possibly eliminate
political conflicts over particular issues, a country's fundamental
regulative principles and structure might receive such widespread
support as to survive particular controversies." Robert A. Dahl,
Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982) , 161; also, "Polyarchy is a function of consensus on
t h e ... norms...." Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 76. "The liberal,
therefore, needs a scheme of civil rights, whose effect will be to
determine those political decisions that are antecedently likely to
reflect
strong
external
preferences...."
Ronald
Dworkin,
"Liberalism," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge, Eng: Camgbridge University Press, 1978), 134.
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individualists on this point is that reason, or some
permutation of self-evident truth, is the source of
foundational consensus. For communitarians, the sharing of
ascribed attributes are the basis of collective values. In
the hermeneutic model, public discourse energizes a fluid
and dynamic public discourse, which in turn yields workable
agreements on both immanent and fundamental issues.
The relevant point here is that consensus for liberal
individualists, and shared understandings for
communitarians,

fulfill parallel purposes. For

communitarians, the community itself, as the vehicle for
understanding norms and traditions, is the source of shared
understandings. It is on the source of consensus and shared
understandings that liberal individualists and
communitarians disagree. The hermeneutic perspective
democratic citizenship is clearly distinct from the other
two models on the nature, source, and function of basic
agreement. Aristotle refers to the "sharing of common views"
in the context of the polis1 ability to make judgments on
everyday issues. The context of this section is a discussion
of the polis as an association which includes the analogy
that useful is to just as harmful is to unjust. The
immanence of this perspective is illustrated in that the
unjust is unjust because it is harmful, and the just is just
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because it is useful.147 Once again, harmful and useful are
gauged using citizens' perception of their proximate
interests as the referent. The hermeneutic model of
democratic citizenship emphasizes the doable and the
tangible over the ideological and the abstract.
The significance of humans as the reference point is
further underscored by remembering that the hermeneutic self
is neither an idealized nor reified self. With regard to the
self, Aristotle remarks that speech, not intelligence, is
the distinguishing feature of humans, because it permits the
articulate expression of ideas.148 Although intelligence is
the means of theoretical reasoning, only (some form of)
speech makes the transmission of any idea, whether concrete
or abstract, possible. This stance is concordant with the
epistemological perspective of the polity in the hermeneutic
model. The polis is not founded on, nor does it justify its
existence on, the basis of revealed or transcendent truth.
The conceptual grounding of the city is the perspectives,
discourse, and decisions of the citizens. Within this
framework citizens have the latitude to construe "the good

147 "Speech. ..serves to indicate what is useful and what is
harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real
difference between humans and other animals is that humans alone
have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. It is a
sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a household
and a state." Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962),
1253a7.
148 Ibid., 1253a7.
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life" in a variety of ways.149
For Aristotle, excellence of character cannot be
generalized across the citizen body because individuals
differ in function and opinion, "a state is made up of these
and many other sorts of people besides, all different. The
virtue of all the citizens cannot, therefore, be
one...."150 This statement is all the more significant
considered in light of Aristotle's emphasis on virtue and
excellence of character. Citizens may be more inclined to
agree on fundamental but abstract issues such as good and
evil, justice and injustice. These foundational areas of
concord facilitate the functioning of the first half of the
hermeneutic circle. At the same time, Aristotle recognizes a
broad diversity of beliefs on pivotal foundational political
questions such as what the state is, and what constitutes a
citizen. This plurality of ideas promotes the processes of
the second half of the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic
approach does not seek to transcend political conflict
because it affirms the legitimacy of the contestability of

149 This point also undermines the linkage between Aristotle
and communitarians. As we have observed, Aristotelian teleology in
the context of the good life is grounded in the citizens' view of
their collective self-interest as a reference point, rather than a
transcendent or universal perspective on "the good." This is the
context of the observation that, "[W]hile the state came about as
a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure
the good life." Ibid., 1252b27.
150 Ibid. , 1277a5 .
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such issues.151
To communitarians, communities provide citizens with
the context for forming and acting on collectively
determined concepts of the good. Once again we find an
epistemological equilibrium because these concepts of the
good are also of constitutive significance to the community.
"Good" in these terms may be "good for" in an Aristotelian
sense, or "the good," in a Platonic sense. From an
Aristotelian perspective the community is viewed
teleologically: the community is good for helping citizens
to achieve their collective and individual aims (that is,
their telos). Therefore, the community is the means to the
end. From a Platonic standpoint, a properly arranged
community is good in itself, and is consequently an end in
itself. In either case, the content and focus of citizens'
concepts of the good are inherently social. The universal
and transcendent notions of the good which are produced by
the antecedence of the individual or the community,
respectively, are simply absent from the hermeneutic model.
151 "In considering the varieties and characteristics of
constitutions, we must begin by looking at the state and asking
what it is. There is no unanimity about this....So also we must
ask, Who is a citizen? and, Whom should we call one? Here too there
is no unanimity, no agreement as to what constitutes a citizen...."
Ibid.,
1274b32-1275a2. "The state consists not merely of a
plurality of men, but of different kinds of men; you cannot make a
state out of men who are all alike." Ibid., 1261a22. Aristotle's
tongue-in-cheek critique of the level of unity advocated by Plato
also illustrates this point, "...it may be an admirable state of
affairs where 'all1 say the same thing, it is nevertheless
impossible." Ibid., 1261bl6. Aristotle is here referring to Plato,
The Republic, 462c.
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A Hermeneutic Model of Citizenship as a Mean Between Liberal
Individualism and Communitarianism
At the most fundamental level, Aristotle's polity
exhibits the mean in a balance between concern for the
individual and concern for the political community. In the
current debate between communitarians and liberal
individualists, Aristotle therefore provides not simply an
alternative, but a middle ground. The hermeneutic approach
precludes the constraints of the dualism which is so
pervasive in the debate between liberal individualists and
communitarians. When a hermeneutic model is applied to the
issue of the self as citizen, the mean connotes balance in
the symmetry between the politics of the self and the
politics of the community.
As we might expect, citizenship is central in the
Aristotelian schema. Citizenship is a significant context
for the interdependent functioning of the sociallyconstituted and individuated aspects of the self. Virtually
all discussion of humans in the collective sense, in The
Politics. centers on the characteristics of citizens and
their public/political activities.152 In answering the
question of "what constitutes a citizen," Aristotle focuses
on the requirement that a citizen be capable of functioning
in two alternating roles, "...the virtue of a citizen of
152 Although this is a central theme throughout, the individual
in the public sphere is explicated in Book III of The Politics,
when Aristotle poses the question, "what constitutes a citizen?".
Ibid., 1274b32.
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repute seems to be just this— to be able to rule and be
ruled well."153 The tendency to distinguish between leaders
and led is deemphasized by the certainty that each citizen
will both rule and be ruled at various times. This discounts
the common distinction between the rulers and the ruled, as
well as reducing the grounds for differentiation on the
basis of expertise or authority between the speaker and
audience in political discourse.154
The dialectics involved with communicative interaction
in this format create the milieu for egalitarian dialogue.
Analyses of the documented ordinances regarding leadership
and debate in the Athenian polis provide an-historical means
of visualizing the terms of democratic political discourse,
where both sides of the hermeneutic circle are in
evidence.155 What we find in Aristotle is insight into the
ideological substructure of the statutes which governed
public discussion. This is, in a sense, more fundamental in
that it informs us of the attitudes and norms that resulted
in the codification of rules for office holding and public

153 Ibid. , 1277a25 .
154 A citizen speaking in the Assembly may be one who is being
ruled, just as easily as one who is ruling. Moreover, even if a
speaker is an elected official or a person filling a position
determined by lot, the position filled is one which a variety of
citizens have held and will hold.
155 Outstanding examples here include Christian Meier, The
Greek Discovery of Politics, Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in
Democratic Athens, and Philip Manville, The Origins of Citizenship
in Ancient Athens.
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debate.
The hermeneutic model of the self incorporates the
dynamics of a citizen body which validates and examines
fundamental areas of consensus in the polity. Public
discourse builds on and questions shared understandings.
Foundational areas of agreement are not grounded in a
utopian view of the self, or a mystical understanding of
community. Rather, the hermeneutic aspects of democratic
functioning tend to recast citizen's interests in the
direction of consensus. Communicative interaction not only
reveals preferences but molds and shape them,
For even where there are many people, each has
some share of virtue and practical wisdom; and
when they are brought together... so also do they
become one in regard to character and
intelligence.156
This illustrates an intrinsic good of hermeneutic democracy:
it creates a context in which citizens will expect to be
influenced positively by fellow citizens.
Accordingly, the source of citizens' respect for
decisions made in a democratic manner is not the rightness
of written laws, but the reciprocal nature of public
discourse.157 While the democratic citizen engages in
autonomous reflection, he/she also retains an attitude of
flexibility regarding his/her own inclinations,
156 Ibid., 1281a39.
157 "For the equitable is held to be right, and equity is right
going beyond written law." Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (London:
Penguin, 1991), 1374a.
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Deliberation operates in matters...whose outcome
is unpredictable, and in cases in which an
indeterminate element is involved. When great
issues are at stake, we distrust our own abilities
as insufficient to decide the matter and call on
others to join us in our deliberations.158
The hermeneutic processes of Aristotelian democracy nurture
the capacity for individual citizens to be persuaded by
other members of the polity.159 Unlike communitarianism
which depicts amicable relations between citizens on the
bases of hereditary characteristics, the hermeneutic model
explains the collegial features of community as being the
consequence of citizens' involvement in both halves of the
hermeneutic processes.
Once again we note a contrast with the liberal
individualist approach where interests are communicated
through the relatively private act of voting, and with the
communitarian notion which presupposes consensus based on
common membership. In hermeneutic democracy, public
discourse is the framework for the disclosure of
preferences. Consequently, the aggregation of opinions and
interests does not take place in a vacuum, but neither is
agreement assumed. Because interest aggregation is carried
out through collective dialogue and deliberation,

158 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1962),
1112b.
159 "For while opinion is no longer a process of investigation
but has reached the point of affirmation,
a person who
deliberates... is still engaged in investigating and calculating
something not yet determined." Ibid., 1142b.
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preferences are impacted. The influence of public debate is,
for individual citizens, a deeper understanding of
alternative viewpoints, and for the political community, a
more fully informed consensus.
As we have seen, Aristotle does not entertain an
idealized notion of the self, nor does he make fantastic
claims as to the expected capacities of democratic citizens.
Nevertheless, we find an expectation that the citizen body
will make good decisions. The oolitikon zoon. is a citizen
who, in concert with other citizens, makes the best possible
choices on public matters,

M ...[E]ach individual will indeed

be a worse judge than the experts, but collectively they
will be better, or at any rate no worse."160
On what grounds does Aristotle expect the political
community to abide by policy choices made in a collective
manner? The answer here is twofold. The first explanation is
what we have just outlined: the attitude of the citizens is
such that they will expect democratic discourse to produce
appropriate decisions. The legitimacy and authority of such
determinations are based on the inclusiveness of public
discourse and the "collective wisdom" of the citizenry. The
second defense for this claim is the influence of democratic
education.161 Education in the Aristotelian schema refers
160 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1282al4.
161 "...[A] state is a plurality, which must depend on
education to bring about its common unity." Aristotle, The
Politics, 1263b29. "In matters that belong to the public, training
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to childhood education in the sense of instruction, as well
as to the educative benefits of democratic
participation.162
With regard to questions of structural and
institutional balance, the hermeneutic model indicates that
equilibrium is achieved by the mixing of regimes.163 For
Aristotle, politeia is context-specific, reflecting a

for them must be the public's concern. Ibid., 1337all. For
Aristotle's discussion of this please see Book VII of The Politics,
particularly chapters i and ii. The importance of public education
on the topic of citizenship in democracies is, of course, a current
topic. Please see, for example, Benjamin R. Barber, An Aristocracy
of Everyone: The Politics of Education and the Future of America
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and
Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven: Yale
University Press,
1991); Eric B. Gorham,
National Service.
Citizenship, and Political Education (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1991); Amy Gutmann, "Undemocratic Education," in
Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1989),
71-88;
Carole
Pateman,
Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, ENG: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), especially Chapter 2 and Conclusion;
Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions of
Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992) .
162 "...[P]ractical wisdom deals with particular facts...is
common to both kinds, (i.e. practical and political wisdom), and is
concerned with action and deliberation." Aristotle, Nichomachean
Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1962), 1141b. "Practical wisdom is
concerned with particulars... and knowledge of particulars comes
from experience." Ibid., 1142a. Also, please see Aristotle, The
Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), VUI.i-iii.
163 Please see Aristotle, The Politics. Ill.vii and IV.ix. The
organizational schema which Aristotle advocates for the polity is
not, strictly speaking, democracy, but politeia. because it is a
more balanced form. In the six cell matrix, politeia denotes rule
by the many in the interest of the many, (whereas democracy denotes
rule by the poor in their own interest). Unfortunately, we use the
word democracy to describe what Aristotle meant by politeia. losing
the capacity to distinguish between the original meaning (except by
resort to unwieldy descriptions of class-based and/or economicallydetermined interests) .
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combination of the three right forms of government in a
manner appropriate to a specific political community.164 In
contrast to the particularism and moderation of the
hermeneutic model, liberal individualism and
communitarianism reflect asymmetry in the relationship
between the individual citizen and the polity, in matters of
priority and precedence.
The liberal individualist premise of the antecedence of
the individual combined with the probability that the state
could use its power to violate individual rights means that
allocation of power becomes the essential function of
politics. Moreover, this allocation incorporates the
potential for coercion, especially because power is scarce,
and trade-offs are zero-sum.165 We have noted in the
164 Please see Ibid., IV.ii and IV.xi. Although Athens is
central in Aristotle's observations, his interest in the written
constitutions and political practices of other poleis is quite
apparent. Perhaps Aristotle's own status facilitated his ability to
gain some detachment by which to make the comparative observations
we have in The Politics. Aristotle was from Stageira in Macedonia,
and resided in Athens at various points in his life as a resident
alien. Please see Introduction by T. A. Sinclair in ibid.
165 One of the concerns expressed by liberal individualists
over the implications of communitarianism is the potential for the
emphasis on community to evolve, (in terms of practical policy),
into a relative loss of power of individual citizens. Examples of
this include Sartori who writes: "In the city-communities of
antiquity, liberty was not expressed through opposition to state
power— for there was no state— but through participation in the
collective exercise of power. But once we have a state that is
distinct from and ordained over, society, the problem is reversed,
and a power of the people can only be a power taken away from the
state." Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited
(Chatham: Chatham House, 1987), 291. Richard Arneson inquires
whether power trade-offs between individuals and the state are
zero-sum, or in practical terms, does augmentation of a sense of
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hermeneutic model a balancing of the allocation of power
between the citizens and the nation-state, without
presupposing that this is a zero-sum trade-off. The rules of
Pareto optimality do not apply because of the manner in
which the interests of the city and the citizens are
integrated. The language of hermeneutic democracy does not
set up a conflict of interests between the individual and
the community, as do liberal individualists. But neither
does hermeneutic democracy finesse the issue of political
conflict, as communitarians do by presupposing unity
resulting from common membership. In the hermeneutic model,
that which benefits the individual citizen will also benefit
the whole, and vice versa. Pursuing the welfare of the
citizen and the polity is one endeavor, obviating the
likelihood of power struggles between the citizens and the
collectivity.
In the hermeneutic model, citizens do not see their
interests as being separate from, much less contradictory
community and the actual prerogatives of community result in a
decrease of the power and choices of individuals? Please see
Richard J. Arneson, "Liberal Democratic Community," in Democratic
Community. eds. John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York
University Press, 1993), 191-95. From a communitarian standpoint,
Thomas Moody charges that liberal individualists are inextricably
trapped by the constraints of Pareto optimality, "To see the issue
as the individual 'versus' the society is to endorse a particular
Hobbesian-liberal world view about the relationship between
individuals and their societies. It is to endorse the belief that
this relationship must be a zero-sum game where what one party
gains the other loses." Thomas Moody, "Liberalism and an Eccentric
Communitarianism," in The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate, ed.
C.F. Delaney (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1994), 98.

136
to, those of the polis. The distinguishing feature of the
hermeneutic model here is that integration of public and
private interests is not effected by an idealized depiction
of human nature.166 For Aristotle, the merging of the
interests of the citizens with those of the polis is a
fragile and dynamic consolidation continuously nourished
through the dialectics of public discourse and citizen
participation. The practical prescriptives which advocate
communicative interaction between the citizens, facilitate
the balancing of the respective values of theory and
practice, speech and action, the letter of the law and the
spirit of the law, and the interests of citizens and those
of the polity.
One of the impediments to communication between liberal
individualists and communitarians is a preoccupation with
rights. Liberal individualists are concerned with individual
rights and communitarians with the rights of the community.
The view of democratic citizenship expounded by Aristotle
has much to offer in this regard. The Aristotelian
perspective disaggregates the concept of rights,
demonstrating instead a concern with the issues of
citizenship, human fulfillment, the socio-political
166 For examples of perspectives where such a union of the
interests of the individual citizens with those of the community is
based on an idealized view of both individual and polity, please
see, Alisdair MacIntyre, "The Privatization of Good," in The
Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate. ed. C.F. Delaney (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994); also, Leo Strauss,
The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), 93-113.
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community, and the relationship between the individual and
the city-state.
The pertinent distinction here between Aristotelian
hermeneutics and both communitarianism and liberal
individualism is not an absence of the language of rights,
but that the individual and the polis are not considered
separately. They are not evaluated on different bases, and
neither takes precedence over the other. For our discussion
of citizenship, this means that neither the individual nor
the polis could be of primary, or secondary importance.
Therefore decisions regarding membership take into
consideration what is optimal for both citizens and
community. While acknowledging that the individual and the
polity are distinct, the model of the self does not place
the individual at odds with the polity,

(as with liberal

individualism), and the model of the polity does not place
it at odds with the individuality of citizens,

(as with

communitarians). Simply put, the actual connection between
collective and individual welfare is the reason for the
theoretic bond between the citizen and the polity. In a
hermeneutic theory of democratic citizenship based on
Aristotle's perspective, theory itself is pragmatically
grounded, being built on practical observations rather than
hypothetical constructs and thought experiments.
In The Politics for example, the bond between the
individual and the polis is both the context of establishing
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conceptual foundations and framing everyday issues.
Moreover, this approach is entirely consistent with an
understanding of the human as a politikon zoon. and the
polis as a composite organism. The polity is an organic
whole made up of citizens. Practically speaking, the
association of citizens constitutes the polis. With regard
to epistemology, the same association exists on the
perceptual level between the citizens and the state. The
aggregated preferences and collective decisions of the
citizens are the interests and actions of the polis.
Interpreting this observation as an assertion that the
interests of the polity are more important than those of
individuals is to view it through a lens of modernity that
distorts it considerably. As we have observed, in
Aristotle1s schema the importance of the interests of the
state relative to those of citizens is a moot point. The
phrase "democratic state" could be considered a
contradiction in terms because the fundamental
characteristic of the democracy,

(that is, politeia), is

that it is stateless.167
A modern interpretation which equates antecedence with
precedence suffers from the effects of the dualism which
167 This point is made by Giovanni Sartori in The Theory of
Democracy Revisited. 278-80. Indeed, Aristotle describes the
authority of the citizenry in such a way: "For the people have made
themselves masters of everything and administer everything through
decrees of the Assembly and decisions of the law courts, in which
they hold the power." Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens (New
York: MacMillan, 1974), 41.2.
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tends to force observations and conclusions toward polarized
or even extreme positions. Aristotle's adherence to the
principle of the mean has a moderating effect generally lost
on contemporary audiences. The approach found in Aristotle
integrates and balances components which modern thought
tends to view as competing or mutually exclusive. As we have
seen, interests of citizens and of the state are not viewed
separately from a hermeneutic standpoint. In addition, the
politeia,

(what I refer to as democracy), is advocated as

optimal, not in terms of being a distinct form, but because
it combines and integrates the desirable characteristics of
other regime types.168
Citizens in each of the three models under
consideration are undoubtedly impacted by the type of
political community to which they belong. Lines indicating
the direction of influence between citizens and the polity
must be drawn in both directions because not only do
individuals determine the arrangement of the polity, but

the

characteristics of the polity shape the expectations and
behaviors of citizens. In hermeneutic theory, the
description of the public and political self, that is, the
citizen, is associated with democracy as the corresponding
168 mphere must therefore be as many constitutions as there are
arrangements of the superiorities and differences between parts.
But
they are commonly reckoned to be two...democracy
and
oligarchy.... But our own classification is better, as well as more
accurate,
because
the well-formed
constitutions
are...the
harmonious and well-balanced mixture." Aristotle, The Politics
(London: Penguin, 1962), 1290a3-1290al3.
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regime type,
A citizen will necessarily vary according to the
constitution in each case. For this reason, our
definition of citizen is best applied in a
democracy. ...169
We have noted that the relationship between citizens
and the liberal individualist state are the likely to be
adversarial. The reasons for this are evident. First, the
state is required to adjudicate the conflicts that arise
from individuals' pursuit of their personal objectives under
the condition of scarcity. Second, the state is cast in two
conflicting roles: it is assigned to protect the freedom
necessary for the exercise of personal liberty, while it is
also the most likely assailant of this preeminent right.
These tensions put liberal individualists in the
position of explaining how the propensity for discord
between citizens and the state can be minimized. One common
solution is to dilute the influence and involvement of
citizens by strengthening institutions and the prerogatives
of political officials. Cooperative relations between
citizens and the state are promoted by encouraging citizens
to leave ruling to the leaders, while citizens remain free
to pursue their social and economic interests privately.170
169 Ibid., 1275a34-1275b5.
170 Among the most popular versions of this perspective: "First
ofall, according to the view we have taken, democracy does
not
mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the
terms 'people' and 'rule.' Democracy means only that the people
have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to
rule them." Joseph A. Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism and
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This approach avoids dealing with alienation between
citizens and the state, but still accentuates the sources of
the rift since it makes the state appear even more distant
and domineering. By contrast, our analysis suggests that
strengthening the hermeneutic and discursive aspects of
democracy by preventing a rift between citizens and polity.
There is a corresponding imbalance in the communitarian
model of citizenship. The foundation of the communitarian
polity is shared ascribed attributes which ostensibly
produce solidarity and common interests. However, this
places the community in an awkward position. The only means
of evaluating citizens is their continuing agreement with
the community*s traditional premises. A good citizen is one
who accedes to the traditional premises of his/her
community. We are once again faced with a problem arising
from ambiguity among communitarians regarding leadership.
Who is entrusted with definitively interpreting

fundamental

shared understandings? Bonds based on non-elective
characteristics are the foundation of the political
community, but communitarians do not specify the limits of
political authority or the means of reestablishing these
bonds.
The result is the possibility that concerns regarding
solidarity could be "manipulated ideologically to produce a

Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), 284-85.
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sentiment of commonality,"171 even when there are
legitimate conflicts arising from a variety of other
interests.172 The negative potential is that community
leaders could attempt to strengthen internal cohesion by
emphasizing differences between those within and outsiders.
Communitarianism leaves open the threat that influential
individuals may reinforce solidarity among members with
contentious rhetoric, or even through actions designed to
foment conflict with nonmembers. As history and current
events indicate, this produces a negative and hollow
political agenda based in exaggerated differentiation and
truculent posturing.

171 Mark Warren observes the potential for communitarian
premises to be used to orchestrate an artificial form of consensus,
"This is where communitarians are often culpable, and this is why
expansive
democrats
insist that self-transformation
in the
direction of commonality must occur through democratic dialogue—
the context in which ideologically manipulated commonality is least
likely to survive." Mark Warren, "Democratic Theory and Self
Transformation," American Political Science Review. 86 (March
1992), 21.
172 If the communitarian emphasis on the human need for
belonging and solidarity is combined with nationalism, the result
could be an ideological grounding for a virulent form of right-wing
authoritarianism.
Possible
negative
repercussions
of
the
combination
of
communitarianism
and
nationalism
are
under
discussion by those who study resurgent ethnic nationalism. On this
topic, please see Benedict, Imagined Communities; Walker Connor,
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994); Jaskeet S. Sekhon, "Nationalism, Racism
and Communitarianism,"
Paper presented at the
1994
annual
conference of the American Political Science Association, New York;
Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New
Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).

Conclusion

The project undertaken here has been to show how a
hermeneutic model of democracy and citizenship can serve as
a medium of communication in the debate between liberal
individualists and communitarians. Hermeneutic theory
facilitates substantive communication between the
perspectives of liberal individualists and communitarians by
drawing out implications of the emphasis they each place on
significant facets of democracy. At the foundational level,
a hermeneutic approach integrates the socially-constituted
and individualistic aspects of the self in a manner which
indicates that they are not mutually exclusive and that
neither merits a position of antecedence relative to the
other. As a result, hermeneutic theory offers to liberal
individualists and communitarians the means of moderating
intractable premises regarding the self and enhancing the
democratic facets of citizen activity evident in each of the
models. Finally, hermeneutic democracy renders a theory of
citizenship which stands out as a balanced and conciliatory
alternative in the debate between liberal individualists and
communitarians.
The hermeneutic model conceives of democracy as a twosided process, where the first half sees shared
143
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understandings and culture as constituting the individual,
and the second half sees individuals, in all their
diversity, as constituting the matrix of shared culture and
understandings. This perspective is grounded in processes
which reinforce both halves of the hermeneutic circle. The
first half consists of citizens, as a body, using shared
understandings to gain perspective and make judgments on
proximate issues. In the second half, citizens as individual
deliberators engage in analytical evaluation of the polity,
and reevaluation of areas of consensus and the quality of
decisions. The hermeneutic theory of democracy also
maintains a symmetry between the politics of the democratic
self and the politics of the democratic community by
balancing consideration of individual citizens vis a vis the
polity, based on conceptual equilibrium between a self that
is socially-constituted while also an autonomous agent.
From the vantage point of hermeneutic theory, unity,
conformity of belief, and intellectual homogeneity, like
democracy itself, are all matters of degree. Following the
mean by keeping a balance in expectations and in the pursuit
of these characteristics is of the essence. From descriptive
as well as normative standpoints, shared understandings do
not produce the collectivism found in communitarianism.
Rather, the equilibrium of hermeneutic theory suggests how
an heterogeneous body of citizens are capable of functioning
in concert. While immoderate individuation, both in ideas
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and practice, suggests undesirable fragmentation, overdrawn
endorsements of solidarity yield unfounded expectations and
exaggerated visions of unity.
The democratic citizen in Aristotelian thought is one
who is autonomous yet social, capable of articulating selfinterest yet involved in a network of different social
relationships, aware of personal and private needs but
inclined to weigh heavily what he/she perceives to be the
good of the collectivity. In short, the democratic citizen
has diverse roles and, of equal importance, many contexts of
fulfillment. The multi-faceted identity of the democratic
self yields a concept of interest more elaborate than that
which appears in either liberal individualism or
communitarianism. The hermeneutic model of the self is
depicted in the framework of varying capacities, interests,
relationships, and spheres of fulfillment.
In comparing the hermeneutic model of citizenship
derived from Aristotle with those of liberal individualists
and communitarians we see that by beginning with constrained
conceptions of the self, the latter two become bound to
specific expectations of behavior, and therefore to certain
social structures and political institutions. If the
individuation of citizens is based on the notion that their
primary interests are prepolitical, the society and
institutions which such persons create will be designed to
deal with atomistic functioning and conflict resolution. By
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the same token, if the community of origin is conceived as
constitutive of the individual on the basis of ascribed
attributes, a level of consensus and harmony will be assumed
which is superficial because it ignores the contingencies of
disagreements that result from valid differences in
convictions and choices.
I have argued that the hermeneutic model of democracy
and democratic citizenship grounded in Aristotle is useful
in many respects. Obviously, contemporary states present
dilemmas which must be addressed. The complexity and size of
modern states tend to remove them from discourse and direct
contact with citizens. Under these circumstances, the
likelihood for prospective policy to be perceived in terms
of a power trade-off between state and citizens increases
dramatically. In the debate between liberal individualists
and communitarians these concerns appear as disputes over
the relative importance of individual rights and community
rights. Will either set of rights be violated, and will the
potential good that could be accomplished by implementation
of a prospective policy outweigh the damage done by any
abridgement of rights? The language of hermeneutic democracy
once again serves as a medium of communication here by
disaggregating the concept of rights, reducing the tendency
toward polarization, and advancing a more multifarious
approach to the conceptualization of democracy and the
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actual process of democratization.173
In addition to clarifying the issues which divide
liberal individualists and communitarians, examining a
hermeneutic model of democratic processes provides an
accessible version of democratic theory. The hermeneutic
model of democracy incorporates a flexibility and
particularism in its fundamental perspective which results
in a transportable and widely-applicable approach. The
benefits are significant: the hermeneutic model of democracy
provides a cross-cultural and transnational model of
democratic citizenship which does not consider democracy a
static or monomorphic type, but rather emphasizes the
essential aspects of democracy in a manner which remains
sensitive to the broader contexts of specific conditions.
Understanding ways of implementing democracy, and
impediments to democracy, has become even more valuable in
the wake of the cold war. A global increase in the
proportion of democracies, and widespread efforts toward
further democratization make this clear.
173 Among others, James Fishkin, Michael Walzer, William
Sullivan,
Jean
Cohen
and
Carole
Pateman propose
ways
of
reconceptualizing democracy and respiriting democratization within
the large scale nation-state. While acknowledging the undemocratic
implications of the unwieldy state, Cohen and Pateman propose that
the project of democratization be approached by furthering
democratic rules, and practices (especially participation), within
a variety of spheres. This includes realms which are social and
economic as well as those which are overtly political. In Cohen's
schema the aim is a "plurality of democracies." Please see Jean
Cohen, "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society," Philosophy and Social
Criticism 14 (1988): 315-37; also, Carole Pateman, Participation
and Democratic Theory.

148
A hermeneutic approach affords the context for a
substantive dialogue between liberal individualists and
communitarians because of its ability to communicate on
common ground with each of the other two perspectives.
Critiquing the dissension between liberal individualists and
communitarians from this standpoint indicates the following.
Constrained by the model of the socially-constituted self
and the emphasis on shared understandings, communitarians
prioritize the first phase of hermeneutic democracy, while
neglecting the second. Motivated by the individuated model
of the self and the assumption of a citizen body with a
plethora of diverse individual opinions, liberal
individualists stress the second phase of hermeneutic
democracy, to the detriment of the first. Communitarians and
liberal individualists each portray a fragmented half of the
hermeneutic circle, inert as a result of having been
disengaged from the other. The hermeneutic model
characterizes democracy as an ongoing cycle of immanent
processes.
Communitarians accentuate the importance of using
shared understandings as a foundation from which to resolve
practical questions. Liberal individualists stress the
capacity of autonomous individuals to question both the
appropriateness of prosaic decisions and the implications of
the premises which underlie them. For communitarians, the
result is dialogue deficient in democratic legitimacy
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because of the aversion to examinination of the shared
understandings and precedents which serve as guidelines. For
liberal individualists, the result is fragmentation of the
community, and emphasis on differences since there is no way
to explain agreement except on coincidental bases.
An hermeneutic model of democratic citizenship avoids
these imbalances, while incorporating significant facets of
the respective strengths we see in liberal individualism and
communitarianism. Because its epistemological grounding is
flexible and inclusive, a hermeneutic model of democratic
citizenship is capable of nurturing not a detente, but an
entente, between the liberal individualist and communitarian
perspectives. This model achieves balance by avoiding the
confines imposed by either/or approaches. At the level of
the politics of the self, a hermeneutic model of democratic
citizenship desists from adopting a heavily constrained view
of the individual. For this reason, it circumvents the
resultant dualism which narrows the spheres of action which
will purportedly be fulfilling to citizens, and which
ultimately determines the structuration of institutions. The
hermeneutic model of democracy provides both a theory and
practical recommendations regarding citizenship which retain
individuality within commonality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by Martin
Otswald. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
__________ . The Politics. Translated by T. A. Sinclair.
London: Penguin, 1962.
__________ . The Art of Rhetoric. Translated by H.C. LawsonTancred. London: Penguin, 1991.
__________ . Poetics. Translated by Kenneth A. Telford.
Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1961.
__________ . Constitution of Athens and Related Texts.
Translated by Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp. New York:
Macmillan, 1974.
Avineri, Shlomo and Avner De-Shalit, eds. Communitarianism
and Individualism. New York: Oxford University Press,
1992 .
Ball, Terence, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson, eds.
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Barber, Benjamin. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics
for a New A g e . Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984.
__________ . The Conguest of Politics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988.
__________ . "Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent." In
Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum,
54-68. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
__________ . An Aristocracy of Everyone. New York: Ballantine
Books, 1992.
Baynes, Kenneth. "The Liberal/Communitarian Controversy and
Communicative Ethics." Philosophy and Social Criticism
14, no. 3/4 Special Issue (1988): 293-313.
Becker, Lawrence C. "Community, Dominion, and Membership."
Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (1992): 17-43.
150

151
Beiner, Ronald. Political Judgment. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
Beiner, Ronald, ed. Theorizing Citizenship. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1995.
Bellah, Robert N . , Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann
Swidler, Steven M. Tipton. Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
Brubaker, Roger. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and
Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
___________ . "International Migration: A Challenge for
Humanity." International Migration Review 25, no. 4
(Winter 1991): 946-57.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France.
Conor Cruise O'Brien, ed. London: Penguin, 198 6.
Chapman, John W. and Ian Shapiro, eds. Democratic Community.
New York: New York University Press, 1993.
Cohen, Jean. "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society."
Philosophy and Social Criticism 14, no. 3/4 Special
Issue (1988): 315-37.
Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956.
___________ . Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs.
Control. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. "Citizenship and Beyond: The Social
Dynamics of an Idea," Social Research 41:4 (Winter
1974) 673-701.
Daly, Markate, ed. Communitarianism: A New Public Ethics.
Belmont: Wadsworth, 1994.
De Crespigny, Anthony and Alan Wertheimer, eds.
Contemporary Political Theory. New York: Atherton
Press, 1970.
Delaney, C.F., ed. The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994.
Dessler, David. "What's At Stake in the Agent-Structure
Debate?" International Organization 43, no. 3 (Summer
1989): 441-73.

152
Dworkin, Ronald. "Liberalism.11 In Public and Private
Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire, 113-43. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978.
____________. "Liberal Community." California Law Review 77
(1989): 479-504.
Euben, J. Peter. The Tragedy of Political Theory. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990.
Gauthier, David. "The Liberal Individual." In
Communitarianism and Individualism, eds. Shlomo Avineri
and Avner de-Shalit, 151-164. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992.
j

Gutmann, Amy. "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (Summer 1985),
308-22.
__________ . "The Disharmony of Democracy." in Democratic
Community, eds. John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro, 12 660.
New York: New York University Press, 1993.
____________ . "Undemocratic Education."
In Liberalism and the
Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum, 71-88. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989.
Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. "Moral Conflict and
Political Consensus." Ethics 101 (October 1990): 64-88.
Hampshire, Stuart. "Morality and Pessimism." In Public and
Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire, 1-22.
Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
__________ . "Public and Private Morality." In Public and
Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire, 23-54.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Hayek, Friedrich A. "Equality, Value and Merit." In
Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael J. Sandel, 8099.
New York: New York University Press, 1984.
Hegel, Georg W. F. Political Writings.T. M. Knox, trans.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 64.
__________ . The Phenomonology of Mind. J. B. Baillie, trans.
London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1910.
Hollis, Martin. Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on
Social Action. Cambridge: University of Cambridge
Press, 1977.

153
Kant, Immanuel. "Perpetual Peace." In On History, ed. Lewis
White Beck, 85-136. New York: Macmillan, 1963.
___________ . "Idea for a Universal History from a
Cosmopolitan Point of View." In On History, ed. Lewis
White Beck, 11-26. New York: Macmillan, 1963.
___________ . "Conjectural Beginning of Human History." In On
History, ed. Lewis White Beck, 53-68.
___________ . "The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals."
In The Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals, trans.
H. J. Patton, 55-113. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
___________ . "Critique of Pure Practical Reason." In The
Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals, trans. H. J.
Patton, 114-31. New York: Harper and Row, 19 64.
Keyt, David and Fred D. Miller, Jr., eds. A Companion to
Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
Kymlicka, Will. "Liberal Individualism and Liberal
Neutrality," Ethics 99 (1989): 883-905.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Thomas I. Cook,
ed. New York: MacMillan, 1947.
Macedo, Stephen. Liberal Virtues: Citizenship. Virtue and
Community in Liberal Constitutionalism. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990.
MacIntyre, Alisdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
___________ . Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
___________ . Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990.
Manville, Philip Brook. The Origins of Citizenship in
Ancient Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990.
Meier, Christian. The Greek Discovery of Politics. David
McLintock, trans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1990.
Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative
Government. ed. Currin V. Shields. New York: BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1958.

154
____________. On Liberty, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb. London:
Penguin, 1974.
____________ . Utilitarianism. Buffalo: Prometheus Books,
1987.
Miller, David. "Community and Citizenship." In
Communitarianism and Individualism, eds. Shlomo Avineri
and Avner de-Shalit, 85-100. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992.
Moody, Thomas. "Some Comparisons Between Liberalism and an
Eccentric Communitarianism." In The LiberalismCommunitarianism Debate, ed. C.F. Delaney, 91-102.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , 1994..
Mouffe, Chantal. "Rawls: Political Philosophy Without
Politics." Philosophy and Social Criticism 13, no. 2
(1987): 105-23.
Mouffe, Chantal, ed. Dimensions of Radical Democracy.
London: Verso, 1992.
____________. "Democratic Citizenship and the Political
Community." In Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed.
Chantal Mouffe, 225-39. London: Verso, 1992.
Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift, eds. Liberals and
Communitarians. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992.
Nederman, Cary J. "Freedom, Community, and Function:
Communitarian Lessons of Medieval Political Theory."
American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (December
1992): 977-88.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1974.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy
and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press,
1990.
Oakeshott, Michael. Rationalism in Politics and Other
Essays. London: Metheun and Company, Ltd., 1969.
Partington, Angela, ed. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Passerin d'Entreves, Maurizio. "Hannah Arendt and the Idea
of Citizenship." In Dimensions of Radical Democracy,
ed. Chantal Mouffe, 145-67. London: Verso, 1992.

155
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory.
Cambridge, ENG: Cambridge University Press, 197 0.
Phillips, Derek L. Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of
Communitarian Thought. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993.
Putnam, Robert D. with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y.
Nanetti. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1971.
___________ . "Justice as Fairness." In Contemporary
Political Theory, eds. Anthony de Crespigny and Alan
Wertheimer, 192-217. New York: Atherton Press, 1970.
____________. "Justice as Fairness: Political Not
Metaphysical." Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (Summer
1985): 223-39.
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Rosenblum, Nancy L . , ed. Liberalism and the Moral Life.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
___________ . "Romantic Communitarianism: Blithedale Romance
Versus the Custom House." In The LiberalismCommunitarianism Debate, ed. C.F. Delaney, 57-90.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacgues. The Social Contract. Maurice
Cranston, trans. London: Penguin, 1968.
___________ . "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men." In The First and Second
Discourses, trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R.
Masters. New York: St. Martin's Press, 19 64.
Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
___________ . "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered
Self," Political Theory 12 (February 1984): 81-96.
____________, ed. Liberalism and Its Critics. New York: New
York University Press, 1984.

156
Sartori, Giovanni. The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Parts
I and I I . Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.,
1987.
Scanlon, T. M. "Rights, Goals and Fairness." In Public and
Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire, 93-112.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy.
New York: Harper and Row, 1942.
Schwartz, Joel D. "Participation and Multisubjective
Understanding: An Interpretivist Approach to the Study
of Political Participation," The Journal of Politics 46
(1984): 1117-1140.
Sekhon, Jaskeet. "Nationalism, Racism and Communitarianism:
A Pooled Covariance Structure Analysis Using French and
German Euro-Barometer Data." Paper delivered at the
1991 annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, New York City, September 2-5, 1994.
Shklar, Judith N. "The Liberalism of Fear." In Liberalism
and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum, 21-38.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
Sophocles. "Antigone.11 In The Oedipus Cycle. Dudley Fitts
and Robert Fitzgerald, trans. New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1977.
Strauss, Leo. The City and M a n . Chicago: Rand McNally and
Co., 1964.
Taylor, Charles. "The Politics of Recognigition." In
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed.
Amy Gutmann, 25-74. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992.
________ .
"Hegel: History and Politics." In Liberalism
and Its Critics, ed. Michael J. Sandel, 177-99. New
York: New York University Press, 1984.
__________ . Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Cambridge,
Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
__________ . "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian
Debate." In Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy
Rosenblum, 159-82.
Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1989.
Thucydides. The Peloponnesian W a r . Richard Crawley, trans.,
T. E. Wick, ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1982.

157
Walzer, Michael. Radical Principles. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1980.
___________ . "Philosophy and Democracy." Political Theory 9,
no. 3 (August 1981): 379-99.
___________ . Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and
Equality. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.
___________ . "The Civil Society Argument." In Dimensions of
Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe, 89-107. London:
Verso, 1992.
Warren, Mark. "Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation."
American Political Science Review 86, no. 1 (March
1992): 8-23.
__________ . "New Patterns of Politicization: Implications
for Participatory Democratic Theory," Paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C., September 2-5, 1993.

VITA

Paulette Ann Parker
Born in Detroit, Michigan, September 17, 1951.
Graduated from the College of William and Mary, Cum Laude,
in 1992 with a B.A. in Government. M.A. candidate in
Government at the College of William and Mary, 1995, with
concentration in political philosophy and international
relations *

